Modern War, Nonstate Actors and the Geneva Conventions: No Longer Fit for Purpose? by Qureshi, Dr. Waseem Ahmad














Modern War, Nonstate Actors and the 
Geneva Conventions: No Longer 
Fit for Purpose? 
DR. WASEEM AHMAD QURESHI*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................220
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................220 
II. ANALYSIS ................................................................................................222 
A. Effects and Effectiveness of the GCs ..............................................222 
1. States’ Behavior Toward the GCs...........................................223 
2. Effects of Violations of the GCs on the Civilian  
 Population ..............................................................................224 
3. A World Without the GCs .......................................................226 
B. Violations of GCs in Modern Times...............................................227 
1. Afghan War.............................................................................228 
2. Iraq War .................................................................................230 
3. Syrian War ..............................................................................232 
C. The GCs’ Challenges in Protecting Civilians ................................234 
1. Unguided/Heavy Explosive Weapons .....................................235 
2. Siege of Territories .................................................................238 
D. Role of NSAs in the GCs’ Futility ..................................................240 
1. Applying the GCs to NSAs ......................................................242 
2. What Does the Employment of NSAs Generate?.....................244 
3. The Use of Mercenaries ..........................................................245 
4. Relaxation of the GCs .............................................................247 
E. Cyberwarfare .................................................................................248 
1. Calls for a Digital Geneva Convention...................................248 
2. Application of Existing Laws ..................................................251 
*  © 2021 Dr. Waseem Ahmad Qureshi.  Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan. 
 219


















   






F. Enforcement and Compliance ........................................................ 253 
1. Inducing Compliance .............................................................. 254 
III.  CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 257 
ABSTRACT
Many enduring armed conflicts of the last couple of decades have 
displaced millions of civilians, giving rise to refugee predicaments around 
the globe. These wars caused many civilian casualties and the destruction
of civilian objects, utterly disregarding the protection offered under the 
Geneva Conventions. Between the rise in violence and the underlying
violations of humanitarian law, the Geneva Conventions have lost their 
significance. Thus, it must be considered whether the Geneva Conventions 
matter anymore with regard to their effectiveness and efficiency. If the Geneva
Conventions are still relevant, then who is responsible for violations
of humanitarian law? Further, when states fight, how can they avoid violations 
of humanitarian law? This Article scrutinizes the efficiency and effectiveness
of the Geneva Conventions in protecting civilian lives and civilian objects 
from the devastation of warfare. This Article intends to list the major 
violations of the Geneva Conventions in modern times and investigate the 
shortcomings of the legal framework to explain the lacunae that are exploited 
by warring states and nonstate actors. Although this Article discusses the 
major challenges faced by the Geneva Conventions to protect civilians,
it also provides a critical assessment of the crucial role of nonstate actors 
in hybrid and asymmetrical warfare in the context of its ramifications for 
the Geneva Conventions. Accordingly, this Article recommends ways to 
induce compliance among states and nonstate actors to better enforce 
humanitarian law and restore the efficacy of the Geneva Conventions in
order to reduce human suffering and restore human dignity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Though humanitarian practitioners argue that the Geneva Conventions 
(GCs) are invaluable in limiting violence during wars, questions regarding 
the GCs’ effectiveness have been raised more prominently.1 This is mainly
because since 1990 armed forces in battle zones deliberately targeted civilians, 
most notably in internal conflicts in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Tajikistan.2 
This trend toward deliberately targeting civilians and property during
1. NINA TANNENWALD, Assessing the Effects and Effectiveness of the Geneva 
Convention, in DO GENEVA CONVENTIONS MATTER? 1 (Matthew Evangelista & Nina 
Tannenwald eds., 2017). 
2. See TANNENWALD, supra note 1, at 1. 
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wars has reached cataclysm in modern warfare too—as shown by the
Syrian, Afghan, and Iraqi wars; the War on Terror; and the involvement 
of nonstate actors (NSAs) and mercenaries in internal and transnational 
armed conflicts.3 The situation has escalated with terrorist organizations
and guerilla warfare using asymmetric warfare tactics that rely heavily on 
blending with civilian populations and deliberately targeting innocent 
people.4 Thus, there is doubt about the relevance of the GCs and international 
humanitarian law in restricting violence against civilians and constraining 
the behavior of states and NSAs.5 
State forces weakened in the face of the asymmetric forces of nonstate 
actors.6 Civil wars in Syria, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, and Libya show the 
GCs to be extraneous and their invocation hypocritical, to the extent that 
Iraq war veterans testified before Congress that the rules of engagement 
7were “thrown out of [the] window.”  Iraq war veterans confessed that they 
witnessed and participated in unwarranted killings and the mistreatment 
of detainees—actions that were commended and encouraged by their 
commanders.8 
This Article investigates the factors that impede the effectiveness of the
GCs by discussing the behavior of states toward international humanitarian 
law, the effectiveness of the GCs, violations of the rules of war, and
underlying challenges of the GCs. To that end, this Article is divided into
five sections. Section II discusses the effects and effectiveness of the GCs
and is divided into three subsections: Section II.A.1 explains the behavior 
of states toward the enforcement of and compliance with the GCs; Section
II.A.2 explores the effects of violations of the GCs on civilian populations; 
and Section II.A.3 imagines a fictional world without GCs. Then, Section 
II.B lists the major violations of humanitarian law in contemporary warfare, 
detailing the major facts and figures on the devastation of civilian lives 
and objects caused during the Afghan, Iraqi, and Syrian wars. Section II.C 
discusses the major challenges of the GCs in their implied protection of 
3. Waseem A. Qureshi, Applying the Principle of Proportionality to the War on
Terror, 22 RICHMOND PUB. INT. L. REV. 379, 407–08 (2019) [hereinafter Principle of 
Proportionality].




 8. Iraq Vets Recount Concerns Over Rules of Engagement, PUB. BROAD. SERV. 
(May 21, 2008, 6:30 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/iraq-vets-recount-concerns-
over-rules-of-engagement [https://perma.cc/LLL4-JMES]. 
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civilian people and civilian objects. Particularly, this section explores the 
challenges faced by GCs due to the widespread use of large explosive
weapons and the indiscriminate deployment of military practices during 
instances of siege. Afterwards, Section II.D examines the role of NSAs in
modern warfare and their effect on the futility of the GCs. Section II.D 
also discusses the employment of mercenaries as an extension of NSAs,
while discussing the argument for relaxing international humanitarian law 
for weak parties to a conflict or for parties fighting terrorists. Section II.E of
this Article explores the applicability of the GCs to cyberwarfare. Finally, 
Section II.F discusses and recommends ways to induce the notion of compliance 
with and enforcement of the GCs.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Effects and Effectiveness of the GCs 
The international community has a profound understanding of the principles 
of the GCs, yet the world is oblivious to, or has seemingly divided opinions 
on, the effectiveness of their reach. A great deal of literature on international 
humanitarian law discusses the gaps and vagueness in the GCs’ laws, 
particularly dealing with their evolving nature and recommending ways 
to improve them.9 While humanitarian organizations document violations 
9. See Morgan Kelley, Challenges to Compliance with International Humanitarian
Law in the Context of Contemporary Warfare (Dec. 10, 2013) (unpublished independent 
study project, School for International Training Study Abroad) (on file with University of 
Texas at Austin), https://digitalcollections.sit.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2643& 
context=isp_collection [https://perma.cc/6XC2-8XVW] (discussing the problem of compliance
related to IHL and GCs); Heiki Krieger, A Turn to Non-State Actors: Inducing Compliance 
with International Humanitarian Law in War-Torn Areas of Limited Statehood (Collaborative 
Rsch. Ctr. SFB 700, Working Paper No. 62, 2013), https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ 
ebooks/files/371505569.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PF6-WV3G] (discussing the problem of
compliance related to IHL and GCs); TANNENWALD, supra note 1 (discussing the effects 
and effectiveness of GCs); Marco Sassóli, The Implementation of Humanitarian Law: 
Current and Inherent Challenges, 10 YEARBOOK INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 45, 48 (2007) 
(arguing that IHL “is not sufficiently understood, or conversely, it is well understood but 
manipulated”); Fritz Allhoff, The War on Terror and the Ethics of Exceptionalism, 8 J. 
MIL. ETHICS 265 (2009) (advocating for relaxation of humanitarian laws in GCs); 
ROUTLEDGE, ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ETHICS AND WAR: JUST WAR THEORY IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 203–21 (Fritz Allhoff, Nicholas G. Evans & Adam Henschke
eds., 2013); INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND 
THE CHALLENGES OF COTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICT 9–12 (2019) [hereinafter ICRC]
(discussing contemporary challenges to IHL and GCs, including issues related to
terrorism, counterterrorism, nonstate actors, artificial intelligence, sieges, and explosive
weapons to enhance respect for IHL); Joseph Guay & Lisa Rudnick, What the Digital
Geneva Convention Means for the Future of Humanitarian Action, UNHCR POL’Y LAB
(June 25, 2017), https://www.unhcr.org/innovation/digital-geneva-convention-mean-future-
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of the laws of wars during armed conflicts, there is a lack of a consequential 
and existential assessment of whether the GCs matter. The scant literature 
that does exist is inconclusive, primarily because it is nearly impossible 
to assess the effects of the GCs on states’ behavior and on the protection 
of civilian lives.10 Instead, that would require an assessment of a fictional 
world, a world without the existence of the GCs.11 When considering their
effectiveness, although the GCs successfully ensured immensely improved 
conditions for prisoners of war and medical operations during armed conflicts, 
these successes are dwarfed by the scale of international humanitarian law 
violations during armed conflicts under the aegis of the GCs.12 These
violations produce questions as to the mindset and rationale of states in 
their behavior toward the GCs, such as why do states violate international 
humanitarian law and fail to comply with their obligations under the GCs? 
1. States’ Behavior Toward the GCs 
As for the compliance and enforcement of international humanitarian 
law (IHL), there are two major schools of thoughts: legalism and realism.13 
Under legalism, it is postulated that states are compliant to the GCs and 
only violate them in emergency situations.14 Legalism assumes that almost 
all countries abide by all international law “as a matter of routine.”15 
In contrast, realism offers a counterargument that all countries follow their 
self-interest, and thus international law has no role in shaping policy.16 
Eric Posner attempts to strike a balance between these two divergent 
approaches, which grossly exaggerate their arguments by taking extremely 
polarized positions.17 Posner posits that “states comply with international
humanitarian-action [https://perma.cc/336J-BBE5] (calling for a new Digital Geneva
Convention). 
10. See generally  MATTHEW EVANGELISTA & NINA TANNENWALD (eds.), DO 
GENEVA CONVENTIONS MATTER? (Oxford Univ. Press 2017) (collecting literature on the 
effectiveness of the Geneva Conventions). 
11. TANNENWALD, supra note 1, at 5.
 12. Id.
 13. MATTHEW EVANGELISTA, How the Geneva Conventions Matter, in DO GENEVA
CONVENTIONS MATTER? 324 (Matthew Evangelista & Nina Tannenwald eds., 2017). 
14. Eric A. Posner, International Law and the Disaggregated State, 32 FLA. STATE 
U. L. REV. 797, 798 (2005). 
15. EVANGELISTA, supra note 13. 
16. Posner, supra note 14. 
17. Id.
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law when doing so enhances their security and wealth, but not otherwise.”18 
Evangelista takes this argument one step further by hypothesizing that
state behavior toward the observation of law is reciprocal in nature.19 For
instance, if both parties to an armed conflict certainly know that no 
prisoner of war (POW) will be taken, and all soldiers will be killed even if 
they surrender, then both parties in an armed conflict will fight ferociously.20 
Though the Hague Convention of 1907 prohibits “giving no quarter,”21 in 
a situation of not taking POWs, as a matter of reciprocity, both legalists 
and realists would agree that both sides should abide by the convention 
regardless of legal obligations.22 So, if countries violate the GCs in their
self-interest, then who pays the price of these violations? Does increased 
violence in warfare mean more civilian casualties? 
2. Effects of Violations of the GCs on the Civilian Population
It is undoubtedly difficult to assess the effects of IHL violations during 
armed conflict on civilian populations. Tannenwald explains that, owing 
to the magnitude and sophistication of the means of using force, the effects 
of wars on civilian populations are harsher in modern warfare when
comparing the history of civilian treatment before and since the GCs.23 
Indeed, it cannot be denied that civilians were calamitously affected during 
the World Wars and civil wars before the advent of the GCs.24 Statistical 
analysts examined the extent to which civilians were the foremost victims 
of armed conflict.25 Several, including Randolph Martin, believe that “civilian 
population displacement and casualties have increasingly become the 
purpose rather than a by-product of war.”26 Statistically speaking, since 
the 1990s, 80% to 90% of victims of wars have been civilians, compared 
18. Id. at 803. 
19. EVANGELISTA, supra note 13. 
20. Id.
21. Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague, IV), art. 23, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 
2277. 
22. See James D. Morrow, When Do States Follow the Laws of War, 101 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 559, 570 (2007). 
23. See TANNENWALD, supra note 1, at 5. 
24. See Christoph Eder, Missing Men: World War II Casualties and Structural
Change 14 (Austrian Ctr. for Lab. Econ. & the Analysis of the Welfare State, Working 
Paper No. 1403, 2014), https://www.labornrn.at/wp/2014/wp1403.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
CK6L-RNJK] (providing statistics on WWII casualties); Nadege Mougel, World War I 
Casualties, EUROPEAN CTR. ROBERT SCHUMAN 1–6 (2011), http://www.centre-robert-
schuman.org/userfiles/files/REPERES%20%E2%80%93%20module%201-1-1%20-%20 
explanatory%20notes%20%E2%80%93%20World%20War%20I%20casualties%20%E2
%80%93%20EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/NCW4-JZWT] (providing statistics on WWI casualties).
25. See TANNENWALD, supra note 1, at 6. 
26. Id.
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to only 5% during World War I.27 However, according to a more detailed
data analysis of civilian victims of wars by the Human Security Report, 
the 9:1 civilian-to-military ratio of casualties stands on shaky ground—
the report dubs it an “urban myth.”28 The statistics are uncertain and 
inaccurate for a number of factors, such as underreporting by aggressors 
and not taking into account the aftereffects of wars (deaths caused by war-
borne diseases and malnutrition).29 
Notwithstanding debates over the accuracy of collecting data on war
victims, the number of civilians affected by wars since World War I has 
risen from 5%.30 According to some analysts’ claims, the numbers of civilian
and military deaths during World War II were equal, and the international 
community agrees that since then, the number of civilian victims has exceeded 
the military casualties.31 If we were to see the effects of the GCs on the
protection of civilians during armed conflicts, this trend of increasing 
numbers of civilian victims coincides with the advent of the GCs, which 
implies that the GCs had a counterproductive effect.32 So, have the GCs 
had no positive effect at all? Why have civilian victims increased in 
number under the aegis of the GCs? Or would the results have been even 
more catastrophic if the civilians had not been shielded by the GCs’ 
protection? Adam Roberts believes that in order to see the effectiveness 
of the GCs, there should be a focus on the individual events of wars since 
statistical analysis is inaccurate when it relies heavily on the deeply flawed 
ratio of military to civil casualties.33 Does this mean that we cannot even
deliberate over the inclusive result-oriented military-civilian casualty ratio? 
No, it only means that, instead of broad-spectrum statistical analysis, 
separate events should be covered individually because no two events are 
identical in their results. Nevertheless, if the overall effectiveness of the 
GCs is to be examined, the result-oriented approach based on the military-
civilian casualty ratio is more cognitively sound than a focused analysis
of single events. It is the nearest possible way to explore our world with 
or without the GCs, because—unless we discussed the actual world before 
27. Id.
 28. Id.; see also Adam Roberts, Lives and Statistics: Are 90% of War Victims 
Civilians?, 52 SURVIVAL 115 (2010). 
29. TANNENWALD, supra note 1, at 6.
 30. Id.
 31. See id.
 32. See id.
 33. Roberts, supra note 28, at 115–36; see also TANNENWALD, supra note 1, at 6.
 225






   









    
     
the GCs came into being—any other examples of a world without GCs 
would have to rely on a fictional world with the same timeline as our own, 
while theorizing on all the infinite relevant factors included in our world’s 
reality. Therefore, to reasonably scrutinize the effectiveness of the GCs,
the world must be viewed as before the GCs and compared with the world 
since the GCs.
3. A World Without the GCs 
A fictional world without the GCs can be imagined to determine whether 
IHL offers any worthy function. That is, how would countries act and 
behave during armed conflicts if civilians were no longer protected from
the ravages of war? The present legal paradigm of international humanitarian
law under the GCs protects civilians by implementing treaty obligations.34 
But what if war crimes are no longer attributable to an antagonist? Would 
the protection of the GCs matter if perpetrators cannot be prosecuted? 
Modern warfare is orchestrated with this idea of consciously avoiding
blame for war crimes.35 For this purpose, states routinely employ nonstate
actors and mercenaries so that retaliatory action and the attribution of war 
crimes can be avoided.36 So the recent hybrid warfare and asymmetric 
tactics of using NSAs gives the effect of a world where there are no GCs, 
which explains the increase in the number of civilian victims in recent 
wars.37 The reason for this is that terrorists and the asymmetric tactics of 
NSAs deliberately target civilians to compensate for the imbalance of 
power in numerical strength and resources.38 A world where the execution 
of war crimes is avoided by employing nonstate actors is the same as a 
34. See ICRC, supra note 9, at 13. 
35. See Andrés B. Muñoz Mosquera & Sascha Dov Bachmann, Understanding
Lawfare in a Hybrid Warfare Context, 37 NATO LEGAL GAZETTE 5, 11–15 (Oct. 2016), 
https://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/media/doclibrary/legal_gazette_37a.pdf [https://
perma.cc/R48Q-EAWZ] (discussing the implications of Israel’s interactions with Hamas) 
[hereinafter NATO]; see also Nadeem Ashraf, The Pursuit of Hybrid Warfare: Muddling 
Towards Clarity and Implementation (Jan. 4, 2017) (unpublished strategy research report) 
(on file with the U.S. Army War College) (discussing NATO’s use of “hybrid warfare”). 
36. Waseem Ahmad Qureshi, Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to 
Non-State Actors, 17 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 1, 22 (2019) [hereinafter IHL to Non-State 
Actors].
37. Waseem Ahmad Qureshi, The Rise of Hybrid Warfare, 10 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L 
& COMPAR. L. 174, 192 (2020) [hereinafter Hybrid Warfare].
38. David Rodin, The Ethics of Asymmetric War, in  THE ETHICS OF WAR: THE
SHARED PROBLEMS IN DIFFERENT PROBLEMS 154–55 (Richard Sorabji & David Rodin eds., 
2006). 
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fictional world where civilians have no protection from the GCs—if the 
GCs cannot be enforced, they are as good as nonexistent.39 
Nevertheless, it would not be absolutely accurate to construe that the 
unenforceability of some violations of the GCs is equivalent to a world
without the GCs. Positive compliance with the GCs must be considered
too when evaluating the effectiveness of the GCs. In addition to the 
violations and loopholes of the GCs as the gap in humanitarian law and
the inefficiency of the GCs, states’ laudable compliance with the GCs also
needs proper commendation. An interesting research question could be
whether states that do not violate IHL would remain nonviolent toward
civilians without their obligations under the GCs. If so, would that be because 
of their pacifistic and passive nature or the reciprocity of other states’
behavior, since violent and aggressive states continue to cause civilian
casualties, civilian displacement, and the destruction of civilian objects 
with or without the GCs? Therefore, to measure the ineffectiveness of the
GCs, it is pertinent to first list the major violations of IHL and the relevant 
effects of these violations on global peace.
B. Violations of GCs in Modern Times 
The War on Terror destabilized and destroyed a number of countries, 
including Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, and Iraq.40 It destroyed essential civilian 
39. IHL to Non-State Actors, supra note 37, at 7–9; see also Mosquera & Bachmann,
supra note 35, at 11, 15–16, 25; see also Ashraf, supra note 35; see also European Commission 
Press Release IP/16/1227, Security: EU Strengthens Response to Hybrid Threats (Apr. 6, 
2016) [hereinafter European Commission]. 
 40. Michel Chossudovsky, Al-Qaeda and the “War on Terror,” GLOB. POL’Y F.
(Jan. 20, 2008), https://archive.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/154-general/26821.
html?tmpl=component&print=1&page=l [https://perma.cc/GPY5-8JEX]; Simon Tisdall,
The US Has Ruined Afghanistan. It Can’t Just Walk Away Now, GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/feb/08/us-afghanistan-civil-war-
fundamentalist [https://perma.cc/RS6R-X2XR] (“A rapid descent into civil war, involving 
government forces, jihadist groups and rival warlords, in a rerun of not-forgotten 1990s 
anarchy, is a strong possibility. Last year saw record civilian deaths, caused by terror 
bombings, intensified fighting and increased U.S. airstrikes.”). See Seumas Milne, Coups
and Terror Are the Fruit of NATO’s War in Libya, GUARDIAN (May 22, 2014), https://www.
theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/22/coups-terror-nato-war-in-libya-west-
intervention-boko-haram-nigeria [https://perma.cc/2CG9-5UVE]; see also Mara Karlin, 
After 7 Years of War, Assad Has Won in Syria. What’s Next for Washington?, BROOKINGS 
(Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/02/13/after-7-
years-of-war-assad-has-won-in-syria-whats-next-for-washington/ [https://perma.cc/2TYT-
34TH]; see also Michael Knights, Infrastructure Targeting and Postwar Iraq, WASH. INST. 
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services, such as electric grids, roads, and markets.41 Millions of civilians 
died and the cost has reached more than $4.4 trillion by 2015.42 The results
of this war have been counterproductive, as evident from increased violence 
and terrorism in the Middle East and heightened insecurity in the West.43 
Shockingly, overall, terrorism increased by an enormous 4500% due to 
the War on Terror.44 
1. Afghan War 
The Afghan War is noted as an unjust war without authorization from 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).45 It cost more than $1 trillion, 
amounting to about $100 million per day.46 The Afghan War claimed the 
lives of 6,800 U.S. soldiers, 30,000 innocent people, and a total of 210,000 
casualties.47 Essential civilian services, including electric grids, schools,
roads, and hospitals are dysfunctional due to the war, the economy is 
dwindling, and violence and terrorism are on the rise.48 Due to violations
of IHL under the GCs, more than 1.17 million war crimes have been reported 
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Afghan War alone.49 
The Afghan War violates the principle of proportionality laid down by 
the GCs.50 The principle of proportionality is calculated by weighing the
FOR NEAR E. POL’Y (Mar. 14, 2003), https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/ 
view/infrastructure-targeting-and-postwar-iraq [https://perma.cc/EK23-EVY8] (analyzing
infrastructure destruction in Iraq). 
41. Knights, supra note 40. 
 42. Nafeez Ahmed, Unworthy Victims: Western Wars Have Killed Four Million 
Muslims Since 1990, MIDDLE E. EYE (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.middleeasteye.net/ 
opinion/unworthy-victims-western-wars-have-killed-four-million-muslims-1990 [https:// 
perma.cc/6D6S-JVK9]; Al Jazeera English, UpFront-Reality Check: The Failure of the 
‘War on Terror,’  YOUTUBE (Sept. 12, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-
X_lBovik_w&lc=Ugh03hvwe52Qc3gCoAEC&ab_channel=AlJazeeraEnglish [https:// 
perma.cc/27Y6-D4EZ]. 
43. Principle of Proportionality, supra note 3, at 407–08. 
44.  Al Jazeera English, supra note 42. 
45. Principle of Proportionality, supra note 3, at 409. 
46. Economic Costs, WATSON INST. FOR INT’L & PUB. AFFS. (Jan. 2020), https:// 
watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/economic [https://perma.cc/5JCA-47NK]; SIMONREICH &
PETER DOMBROSWKI, THE END OF GRAND STRATEGY: US MARITIME OPERATIONS IN THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 36 (Cornell Univ. Press 2017). 
47. Principle of Proportionality, supra note 3, at 410. 
48. Id.; Why Afghanistan Is More Dangerous Than Ever, BBC NEWS (Sept. 13,
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-45507560 [https://perma.cc/Y3UK-R9HD].
 49. Kathy Gannon, Afghans Submit 1.17 Million War Crimes Claims to International 
Court, INDEPENDENT (Feb. 17, 2018), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-
east/afghanistan-war-crimes-claims-victims-millions-submitted-court-isis-taliban-a8214 
301.html [https://perma.cc/ZR43-6XJP].
50. See Principle of Proportionality, supra note 3, at 408–11. 
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overall military objective achieved against the harm caused.51 The military 
objective of the Afghan War was to decrease terrorism and increase U.S. 
security by using force against the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks.52 In a
diversion from the main objective, the United States supported rebel 
groups and warlords as it tried to topple the Afghan regime, and extended 
its military occupation for nearly two decades.53 This war proved to be
counterproductive, and instead increased terrorism, destabilized Afghanistan, 
and inadvertently decreased U.S. security at the cost of billions of dollars, 
millions of lives, the destruction of essential services in Afghanistan, and 
more than one million war crimes.54 Therefore, since the harm caused by 
Afghan War surpassed the trivial good achieved by it, the war is disproportionate 
to its military objectives.55 
51. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 
51(4), June, 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions Protocol I]. 
52. See S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001). 
53. Austin Bodetti, How the US Is Indirectly Arming the Taliban, DIPLOMAT (June
13, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/how-the-us-is-indirectly-arming-the-taliban 
[https://perma.cc/KT8N-J9XT]; see US Invaded Afghanistan Largely to Restore Heroin 
Industry: Scholar, PRESSTV (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2017/11/ 
20/542871/US-invaded-Afghanistan-largely-to-restore-heroine-industry [https://perma.cc/
EQU4-NY2X]; see also Johnny Dwyer, The U.S. Quietly Released Afghanistan’s Biggest 
Drug Kingpin from Prison. Did He Cut a Deal?, INTERCEPT (May 1, 2018, 3:25 PM), 
https://theintercept.com/2018/05/01/haji-juma-khan-afghanistan-drug-trafficking-cia-dea 
[https://perma.cc/6W2F-ZZ3R]; see also Massoumeh Torfeh, No End in Sight 17 Years After 
US Invasion of Afghanistan, TRT WORLD (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.trtworld.com/asia/ 
no-end-in-sight-17-years-after-us-invasion-of-afghanistan-20818 [https://perma.cc/YXV6-
3HEF]; see also Matthew Fay, The War in Afghanistan Is 17, NISKANEN CTR. (Oct. 11, 2018),
https://www.niskanencenter.org/the-war-in-afghanistan-turns-17/ [https://perma.cc/8UJP- 
CA95].
54. REICH & DOMBROSWKI, supra note 46, at 36; Al Jazeera English, supra note 42; 
Neta C. Crawford, Update on the Human Costs of War for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
WATSON INST. INT’L & PUB. AFFS. 1, 2–9 (2016), https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/
files/cow/imce/papers/2016/War%20in%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan%20UPDA
TE_FINAL_corrected%20date.pdf [https://perma.cc/VSB3-HCQL] (discussing the costs 
of war for Afghanistan); General Security Situation in Afghanistan and Events in Kabul, 
EURO. COUNTRY ORIGIN INFO. NETWORK (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/
2002268.html [https://perma.cc/QH6Y-WAL6] (discussing the state of Afghanistan after 
decades of war); see also Why Afghanistan Is More Dangerous Than Ever, supra note 48; 
Gannon, supra note 49. 
55. Principle of Proportionality, supra note 3, at 411–12. 
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2. Iraq War
The Iraq invasion of 2003 was believed to be started on the pretext of 
Kuwaiti defense, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorization 
for the Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the Disarmament Resolution 
of 2002.56 The invading coalition of the United States, the United Kingdom,
Australia, and other states based the Iraq invasion on the pretense of 
preventive self-defense in the face of Iraq’s alleged possession of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMDs).57 In fact, Iraq posed no imminent threat to 
the United States or to the coalition partner states, and the alternative peaceful 
resolutions were not exhausted.58 In the aftermath of the Iraq War, no
WMDs were found in Iraq, and the intelligence documents that reported 
those weapons were forged.59 Therefore, the international community, 
including prominent international legal scholars and global leaders, 
condemned the Iraq invasion as illegal and unjust and deemed it an act of 
pure aggression.60 Without a new UNSC resolution, and without an armed 
attack, the Iraq War was illegal and failed to conform with the U.N. Charter.61 
Further, the Iraq invasion was devised to change a regime, which is not a 
legal basis for full-fledged war under IHL.62 
56. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 
Stat. 1498 (2002); Press Release, John D. Negroponte, U.S. Ambassador, U.S. Permanent 
Representative to the U.N., Explanation of Vote Following the Vote on the Iraq Resolution 
(Nov. 8, 2002); see also Press Release, Jeremy Greenstock, U.K. Ambassador, Sec. 
Council, United Kingdom Explanation on Vote on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 
(Nov. 8, 2002); See S.C. Res. 1441, ¶¶ 2–3 (Nov. 8, 2002). 
57. Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 
Stat. 1498 (2002); Powell Presents US Case to Security Council of Iraq’s Failure to 
Disarm, U.N. NEWS (Feb. 5, 2003), https://news.un.org/en/story/2003/02/58372-powell-
presents-us-case-security-council-iraqs-failure-disarm [https://perma.cc/CUE7-VQD4]
[hereinafter Iraq’s Failure to Disarm].
58. RICHARD N. HAASS, WAR OF NECESSITY, WAR OF CHOICE: A MEMOIR OF TWO
IRAQ WARS 222–23 (Simon and Schuster, 2010). 
59.  TRT World, 9/11 Anniversary: Seventeen Years Since Deadly Sept 11 Attacks, 
YOUTUBE (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JKqjLLS99Vk. 
60. See Principle of Proportionality, supra note 3, at 413–14. 
61. Letter dated Nov. 8, 2002 from the representatives of China, France and the 
Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
U.N. Doc. S/2002/1236 (Nov. 8, 2002); see also Poorvi Chitalkar & David M. Malone, 
The UN Security Council and Iraq 6 (United Nations Univ., Working Paper No. 1, 2013), 
https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:5/wp01_theunscandiraq1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B6RZ-Z5UQ] (indicating the deadlocked nature of the UNSC); Lessons of Iraq War Underscore 
Importance of UN Charter – Annan, U.N. NEWS (Sept. 16, 2004), https://news.un.org/en/story/ 
2004/09/115352-lessons-iraq-war-underscore-importance-un-charter-annan [https://
perma.cc/6V3L-SA82] [hereinafter Lessons of Iraq War]. 
62. Chilcot Report: Tony Blair’s Iraq War Case Not Justified, BBC NEWS (July 6, 
2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-36712735 [https://perma.cc/5GPM-RHJJ];
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Not only was the commencement of the Iraq War unlawful under the 
U.N. Charter, it also grossly violated IHL laid down by the GCs.63 For
instance, if the military objective of the Iraq War was to eradicate the 
imminent threat posed by Iraqi WMDs,64 then the fact that Iraq had no
WMDs makes any harm caused in excess of eradicating WMDs ab initio 
disproportionate.65 The Iraq War cost $190 million per day, caused the
deaths of half a million people, displaced more than three million people, 
destroyed Iraqi infrastructure and governance, and increased violence.66 
The military occupation of Iraq without any justification has still not 
ended after seventeen years of constant war, and there seems no end to 
this brutal violation of the U.N. Charter and the GCs.67 Owing to the
destruction caused by the Iraq War, and because no military objective was 
achieved to eliminate the nonexistent WMDs, the Iraq invasion is 
disproportionate, and it grossly violates the GCs.68 
Report on the Dutch Committee of Inquiry on the War in Iraq, 57 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 81, 
81–83 (2010).
63. Lessons of Iraq War, supra note 61; Principle of Proportionality, supra note 3, at
412–16. 
 64. Iraq’s Failure to Disarm, supra note 57; Authorization for Use of Military 
Force Against Iraq, Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002). 
 65. TRT World, supra note 59; Principle of Proportionality, supra note 3, at 413–16.
 66. REICH & DOMBROSWKI, supra note 46, at 36; Costs of War, WATSON INST. FOR 
INT’L & PUB. AFFS. (2019), https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/ [https://perma.cc/2Y7F-
M55P]; Amnesty Int’l, Amnesty International Report 2017/2018: The State of the World’s 
Human Rights, AI Index POL 10/6700/2018 (2018), https://www.amnesty.org/download/
Documents/POL1067002018ENGLISH.PDF [https://perma.cc/CQ4S-CHUJ]; see JOËLLE
GARRIAUD-MAYLAM, NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, THE WAR IN SYRIA AND IRAQ: 
HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS 5, 9 (2017); see also U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, 
UNHCR Position on Returns to Iraq, at 19 (Nov. 14, 2016) [hereinafter UNHCR Returns 
to Iraq]; see also Jeff McMahan, Vice Admiral James B. Stockdale Ctr. for Ethical Leadership, 
What Makes an Act of War Disproportionate?, at 18 (Mar. 25, 2008) (transcript available 
at U.S. Naval Academy); Al Jazeera English, supra note 42. 
67. Torfeh, supra note 53; Principle of Proportionality, supra note 3, at 413–16. 
68. Principle of Proportionality, supra note 3, at 416. 
 231




















    
  
  
3. Syrian War 
The Syrian civil war started in 2011.69 The United States, along with its 
coalition partners, commenced the Syrian invasion in 2015.70 The justification 
to start this war was the “preventive self-defense of Iraq” against the threat 
posed by NSAs and terrorists from Syria.71 Fighting ISIL and terrorism
under the War on Terror became a second justification, linking ISIL with 
the 9/11 attacks and Al-Qaeda.72 Later, the U.S. White House publicly 
admitted that its goal was to change the Assad regime in Syria by supporting 
Syrian rebel groups.73 Under international humanitarian law, the legality 
of preventive self-defense has long been contested and refuted,74 so the
first justification of defending Iraq is inapplicable. Second, the ICJ in the 
Nicaragua case established that there is no self-defense against NSAs that 
perpetrated an armed attack without proving that they were under direct 
state control.75 This means that there is no legal basis in international
humanitarian law for the United States to fight the War on Terror against 
ISIL.76 Third, regime change is not an exception to the prohibition on the
use of force under the U.N. Charter.77 Only self-defense and UNSC 
69. A Look at US Involvement in Syria, NATIONAL (Apr. 14, 2018), http://www.the 
national.ae/world/mena/a-look-at-us-involvement-in-syria-1.721352 [https://perma.cc/
RHL8-B8AJ].
70. A Look at US Involvement in Syria’s Civil War, MIL. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2018), 
http://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2018/12/19/a-look-at-us-involvement-
in-syrias-civil-war [https://perma.cc/88AV-A6RJ].
71. Kevin Jon Heller, The Invention of the Khorasan Group and Non-Imminent 
Imminence, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 29, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/29/invention-
khorasan-group-non-imminent-imminence [https://perma.cc/TEP4-GSG3]; Federica
D’Alessandra, Jus ad Bellum in Syria: The Meaning of the US Airpower Campaign, HUM. 
RTS. L. WORKING GROUP NEWSLETTER (Int’l Bar Ass’n: Pub. & Prof’l Interest Div.), Mar. 
2015, at 38. 
72. Zeke J. Miller, White House: Iraq War Vote: Obama Opposed Could Be Used 
for ISIS Strikes, TIME (Sept. 13, 2014, 6:03 PM), https://time.com/3362683/obama-isis-
iraq-syria-war-aumf/ [https://perma.cc/W3FK-QLK6].
73. A Look at US Involvement in Syria, supra note 69; Hannah Allam, “Assad Must
Go” Demand Should Go, Ex-White House Official Says, MIA. HERALD (May 12, 2016, 
6:57 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/article77313747.html 
[https://perma.cc/7ZEN-PY6C]; Scott Wilson & Joby Warrick, Assad Must Go, Obama 
Says, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/assad-must- 
go-obama-says/2011/08/18/gIQAelheOJ_story.html?utm_term=.cd5b98800339 [https:// 
perma.cc/T6PZ-3YRG]. 
74. See U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World, Our Shared Responsibility: 
Report of the Secretary-General on the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Security, 54–55, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004). 
75. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 32 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. 
76. Principle of Proportionality, supra note 3, at 416–21. 
77. See U.N. Charter 1945, art. 2, ¶¶  4, 39–51. 
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authorization for force are proper legal bases for using force against other 
states.78 Thus in Syria, which neither used force against another country
nor directly used NSAs to attack another country, the United States and 
its coalition partners could not use force without first acquiring UNSC 
authorization.79 
U.S. support for armed rebel forces in Syria increased violence and 
terrorism in Syria.80 Additionally, this support destabilized the entire region, 
left two million people injured, and caused millions more to be killed, 
kidnapped, and tortured.81 More than five million Syrians have become
registered refugees and 7.6 million—almost half of the Syrian population 
—have been displaced internally and internationally.82 As a consequence
of this war, all the essential services of food, water, healthcare, infrastructure, 
economy, and governance in Syria have collapsed.83 International
humanitarian law under the GCs is also violated by NSAs that are backed 
by coalition forces, terrorists, and the government of Syria.84 
The Syrian civil war by the Western coalition has no legal basis or just 
cause under the international law of using force.85 The military objective
set by the coalition to fight and eradicate terrorism has counterproductively 
increased violence and terrorism.86 Experiences from Iraq and Afghanistan
made it foreseeable that supporting rebels increases violence and terrorism in 
78. Id. art. 2(4), 51. 
 79. William Partlett, Does It Matter That Strikes Against Syria Violate International 
Law?, PURSUIT (Apr. 16, 2018), https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/does-it-matter-
that-strikes-against-syria-violate-international-law [https://perma.cc/9UNK-SS2S]; see 
Tess Bridgeman, When Does the Legal Basis for U.S. Forces in Syria Expire?, JUST SEC. 
(Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/53810/legal-basis-u-s-forces-syria-expire 
[https://perma.cc/DX8W-SDYS].
80. GARRIAUD-MAYLAM, supra note 66, at 4–5. 
81. Id. at 1, 4; U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, International Protection
Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing the Syrian Arab Republic: Update V, at 14–
15 (Nov. 2017) [hereinafter UNHCR International Protection]. 
82. GARRIAUD-MAYLAM, supra note 66, at 4; UNHCR International Protection, 
supra note 81, at 24; Al Marsad, The Syrian Situation - International Humanitarian Law 
Violations and the Call for Justice: A Summary, ARAB HUM. RTS. CTR. IN GOLAN HEIGHTS, 
http://golan-marsad.org/wp-content/uploads/The-Syrian-Situation-International-Law-
Violations-and-the-Call-for-Justice-A-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/8L46-P2GE].
83.  UNHCR International Protection, supra note 81, at 28. 
84. Id. at 15–23. 
85. Partlett, supra note 79; Principle of Proportionality, supra note 3, at 419. 
86. Michael Shank & Kate Gould, Let’s Keep Syria’s Blood Off America’s Hands, 
USA TODAY (July 23, 2013, 1:06 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/07/ 
23/arming-syrian-rebels-civil-war-column/2578667 [https://perma.cc/QDV8-PR8W]. 
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a region.87 Furthermore, no benefit was achieved with respect to the military
objectives in Syria. Instead, infrastructure, governance, and essential services 
were destroyed, in addition to civilian casualties and displacement.88 Moreover, 
the regime change agenda pursued in Syria exceeded the direct military 
objectives and violated international law.89 Therefore, the harm done in 
Syria by violations of humanitarian law under the GCs—the destruction 
of civilian objects and displacement of civilians—exceeds the direct military 
objectives, which makes the Syrian civil war disproportionate under the 
GCs.90 
In all the endless modern wars discussed above, millions of civilians 
have been grossly affected by violations of the GCs. Thus, it is relevant to 
note the challenges that the GCs face in protecting civilian lives and objects.
What factors are compounding the inefficacy of the GCs in protecting
civilians from warfare? 
C. The GCs’ Challenges in Protecting Civilians 
With the advent of global urbanization, armed conflicts have also urbanized 
and civilians suffer the impacts of wars.91 When cities are sieged during
warfare and explosive weapons are used in populated areas, not only do 
civilian casualties and injuries surge but essential services, such as food, 
water, sewerage, and electricity, are also severed by direct and indirect 
attacks.92 As a consequence, prospects of disease outbreaks are heightened, 
mass populations are displaced, and people are unable to return to their 
homes when the conflict is over.93 
In an urbanized war, it is challenging for militaries to avoid civilian 
harm.94 In this regard, the laws of the GCs prohibit direct targeting of 
civilians and civilian objects under the principle of distinction.95 Any
incidental civilian harm that exceeds the anticipated direct military objective 
is also prohibited under the principle of proportionality.96 The GCs require
that precautions be taken to minimize incidental foreseeable civilian harm
under the principle of precaution.97 Despite these protections for civilian 
populations under the GCs, parties to conflicts deliberately and routinely 




 91. ICRC, supra note 9, at 7. 
92. Id. at 7–11. 
93. Id.
 94. Id.
95.  Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 51, art. 48. 
96. Id. art. 51(4) & 57(2)(a). 
97. Id. art. 57(2); ICRC, supra note 9, at 11. 
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endanger civilian lives to gain military advantage, such as by using 
civilians as human shields and taking warfare into densely populated areas.98 
Using civilians as human shields is absolutely prohibited under the GCs, 
and all parties to a conflict must take precautions to not endanger civilians 
by the use of force, which includes the use of explosive weapons.99 However, 
the use of explosive weapons and the sieges of territories are to blame for
the increasing number of civilians affected by armed conflicts. Accordingly, 
Sections II.C.1 and II.C.2 discuss the implications of sieges and explosive weapons 
on the protection of civilians and civilian objects under the GCs. 
1. Unguided/Heavy Explosive Weapons 
The use of explosive weapons is not inevitably problematic in open
battlegrounds, but use of explosives creates significant danger and causes 
enormous harm to civilians when used against military targets situated in 
urban territory.100 Civilian harm in urban areas occurred during the Syrian, 
Afghan, Iraqi, Yemini, Somali and Libyan wars.101 The use of explosive
weapons caused casualties, injuries, the destruction of civilian property, 
schools, hospitals, infrastructure, and other essential services.102 Such
destruction has widespread reverberating effects since all these essential 
services in urban areas are tightly interconnected.103 Furthermore, populations
are displaced, people are exposed to outbreaks of deadly diseases, and sexual 
violence against women is intensified by destruction in populated areas.104 
The GCs do not specifically prohibit the use of explosive weapons in 
populated areas. Instead, this is regulated by humanitarian law that prohibits 
indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks while requiring that precautions 
be implemented.105 Even if these regulations are followed, if a military 
target is situated in a populated area, then civilian harm as collateral damage 
is likely to occur because of the massive footprint of explosive weapons 






 104. Id. at 10–11. 
105. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 51(4), 
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Geneva Conventions Protocol II]; ICRC, supra 
note 9, at 12; Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 51. 
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and the interconnected dependency of civilians on essential services. This
requires a serious reinterpretation and application of the laws of wars in 
urban areas.106 
In 2019, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported
that certain types of ammunitions are highly inaccurate and therefore cause 
serious problems when used in populated urban areas.107 These weapons
include mortars, rocket launchers, artillery and unguided missiles, rockets, 
and munitions.108 The use of these weapons openly abuses the prohibition 
on indiscriminate attacks because they are bound to hit civilians and civilian 
objects along with military objects without distinction.109 For instance, 
harassing, interdiction, suppressive, bracketing, and walking fire techniques 
are normally employed by armed forces even in populated areas while using 
munitions and mortars as indirect engagement with military targets 
to hamper their undertakings.110 It is highly probable that these adjustment
techniques will more likely harm civilians.111 Under IHL, attacks must be 
directly targeted against military targets.112 However, this is often not 
followed, putting the lives of innocent people at risk.113 
One way to overcome this problem is by increasing the accuracy of
weapons, such as by using guided missiles and rockets instead of unguided 
ones.114 Yet, the problem of hitting civilians and civilian objects is still 
not completely solved because large explosive weapons have a massive 
footprint and large radius of destruction, which take civilians, civilian objects, 
and military objects when used in urban settings.115 For example, the use
of drones is supposedly highly efficient in taking out military targets. However, 
for every drone attack that targets one person, on average ten innocent people 
are killed.116 Moreover, due to the inaccuracy and massive footprint of 
explosive weapons, civilians’ interconnected essential services also get 
destroyed, which makes it impossible for populations to inhabit war-torn 
cities or consider returning to such places once the wars are over.117 These 
106. ICRC, supra note 9, at 12. 
107.  Id. 
 108. Id.
 109. Id. at 7–13. 
110. Id. at 13. 
111. Id.
112.  Geneva Conventions Protocol II, supra note 105, art. 13. 
113.  See ICRC, supra note 9, at 13. 
114.  Id. at 12. 
115. Id.
 116. NETA C. CRAWFORD, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR KILLING: MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
FOR COLLATERAL DAMAGE IN AMERICA’S POST-9/11 WARS 209 (Oxford Univ. Press 2013); 
Waseem Ahmad Qureshi, The Legality and Conduct of Drone Attacks, 7 NOTRE DAME
J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 91, 96 (2017) [hereinafter Drone Attacks].
117. ICRC, supra note 9, at 7–12. 
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interconnected essential services include water, electricity, sewage, and 
supply networks—all of which are essential for the sustenance of a society.118 
To avoid impact on civilians, explosive weapons should not be used in
urban regions because of their inaccuracy and massive footprint, which 
unavoidably affect civilians and civilian objects. As discussed, using guided 
missiles such as rockets to discount the problem of inaccuracy is not enough 
and contradicts the law under the GCs, because the radius of large explosive 
weapons is independently detrimental for civilian life.119 If it is vitally
important to take out a military target in a city, then taking precautions 
and not using indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks are prerequisites 
under the GCs.120 To not violate the GCs in urban settings, such attacks 
should ideally not use large explosive weapons, and they should be absolutely 
precise without a large footprint of destruction. 
Ordinarily, the argument of the self-defense of armed forces is used to
justify the use of explosive weapons and indiscriminate attacks in urban 
areas.121 However, the humanitarian law of using force under the GCs, 
such as the prohibition on indiscriminate and disproportional attacks, is 
equally applicable to both offensive and defensive instances.122 In the
ICRC’s view on the situation of defending own forces in urban settings, 
even the defensive use of force should foreseeably take precautions, and 
must be direct and concrete such that the use of heavy explosive weapons 
do not exceed the incidental civilian harm, balancing the humanitarian 
considerations with military advantage.123 In all cases of using force in
urbanized regions, the attacking forces should be prepared to concede 
a high risk to military life if they place high risk on their civilian subjects. 
In any event, a fear of exposure to a higher risk to a state’s own armed 
forces can never justify violations of the GCs/IHL,124 which means that
armed forces subject to the GCs cannot use self-defense as an excuse to 
undertake indiscriminate attacks on civilians. 
Despite there being no prohibition on the use of explosives in populated 
areas, the ICRC suggests that the use of big explosive weapons should be 
118. Id. at 12–13. 
119. Id.
120. Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 51, art. 11, 48, 51(4), 57(2); Geneva 
Conventions Protocol II, supra note 105, art. 13. 
121. ICRC, supra note 9, at 12–14. 
122. Id.; Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 51, art. 48, 51(4), 57(2)(a);
Geneva Conventions Protocol II, supra note 105. 
123. ICRC, supra note 9, at 12–14. 
124. Id. at 13. 
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banned in urbanized regions during armed conflict for three main reasons.125 
First, there is a pattern of high civilian harm from the use of explosive 
weapons in urbanized regions.126 Second, it is unfeasible to respect the 
principles of proportionality and distinction while using explosive weapons 
in populated areas.127 Third, there is no regularity in the application and 
employment of explosive weapons in populated areas.128 To avoid using
explosive weapons in populated areas, states should eagerly participate in 
ICRC armed forces training on weapons adaptability in accordance with
the urbanized settings of armed conflicts to vigorously consider the 
vulnerabilities of civilians and civilian objects.129 
2. Siege of Territories
The concept of a siege or encirclement is not defined under the GCs. It 
can be described as a tactic to surround armed enemy forces in an area to 
restrict their movement and supplies.130 The idea of a siege is to filter the 
area to defeat an enemy by restricting them in a confined space.131 Sometimes
an enemy’s defeat is achieved by starving them out, and in other instances 
civilians are evicted to expose enemies hiding in an urban setting, to be 
able to fight them with minimum civilian harm.132 This way, enemy forces
are isolated from civilians in small, targeted pockets for conventional 
armed fighting.133 This latter technique of not assaulting to capture is 
advantageous for the besieging party, and also avoids excessive harm to 
civilians.134 
The GCs do not outlaw besieging an area to fight enemy forces.135 
Blocking supplies and food in a besieged area is also not prohibited.136 
The besieging party can use armed force to attack a military target in an 
urban area if it conforms with the principles of proportionality, precaution, 
and distinction under the GCs.137 Through these principles, the GCs offer
protection to civilians and civilian objects that remain trapped in a besieged 
125. Id.
 126. Id.
 127. Id. at 14. 
128. Id.
 129. Id.
 130. Id. at 15. 




 135. See id.
 136. See id.
 137. Id. at 15. 
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area.138 Before this protection, stopping civilians from leaving a besieged 
area was deemed harsh but it was not prohibited under the Nuremberg 
trials.139 Since then, the efficacy of protecting civilians during sieges has
improved drastically under the GCs, and vulnerable people in a besieged 
area have a series of protections.140 First, under the principle of distinction, 
directly targeting civilians fleeing a besieged area is strictly outlawed.141 
Second, under the principle of precaution civilians are to be evacuated and 
warned by besieging forces before commencing full-throttle attacks on 
enemy forces, so that incidental harm or collateral damage to civilian lives 
and objects is minimized.142 Both the besieging party and the besieged 
party should allow civilians to evacuate a besieged area when possible.143 
However, besieged parties tend not to allow civilians to escape conflicted
urban settings, so as to gain the advantage of immunity of that location from 
military operations. This practice is strictly prohibited under the GCs, and 
is referred to as human shielding.144 
Similarly, starvation as a weapon of war targeting civilian people is also 
prohibited under the GCs.145 Both parties to a siege must allow civilians 
to evacuate the besieged area.146 Civilians can be forcibly evacuated by a 
besieging party.147 Evicting civilians is safe when both parties to a siege agree 
to do so.148 After evacuation, evicted civilians must be provided with 
shelter, food, hygiene, and health and safety services.149 During eviction,
the besieging party can screen civilians to filter out enemy combatants 
disguised as civilians.150 However, the successful eviction of civilians from a
besieged area does not mean that civilians left in a besieged area no longer 
have the protection offered by GCs.151 No armed attacks can deliberately 
138. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. 
139. ICRC, supra note 9, at 15. 
140. Id. at 16; see Geneva Convention IV, supra note 138. 
141. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWAL-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW VOLUME I: RULES 3–4 (2005). 
142.  ICRC, supra note 9, at 16. 
143. Id.
 144. Id.
145.  Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 51. 
146.  See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 138, art. 49. 
147.  ICRC, supra note 9, at 17. 
148. Id.
 149.  See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 138, art. 49. 
150.  ICRC, supra note 9 at 17. 
151. Id.
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or directly target remaining civilians in a besieged area,152 even after the
evacuation of civilians. Similarly, both parties to a siege must allow neutral 
parties of humanitarian workers to help affected people, such as the wounded 
and sick, during and after an armed conflict in a besieged area.153 Of course,
the besieging party has the right to screen and control these humanitarian 
relief operations.154 Wounded and sick people are protected under the GCs.155 
The humanitarian conditions are exacerbated when a territory is controlled or
sieged by NSAs.
D. Role of NSAs in the GCs’ Futility 
The protections offered to civilians, women and children, the wounded 
and sick, civilians caught in a siege, civilian objects, and prisoners of war 
under humanitarian law in the GCs were either not present or less refined 
in preceding humanitarian law.156 Arguably, the protection offered by
GCs to safeguard civilians and civilian objects have remarkably increased 
over the course of time, by refining laws and by increasing safeguards. 
The present legal framework of IHL has been refined and improved with 
the advent of the GCs and its additional protocols. However, has the 
increased protection under law decreased the effects of war on civilian life 
and civilian objects? If the protection of law to safeguard civilians and 
civilian objects has been improved, it must mean that—with time—civilians
are less affected by armed conflicts. Does the ground reality of armed
conflicts and modern warfare reflect this? 
After the September 11 attacks, a series of wars started to target NSAs, 
such as terrorist organizations.157 These wars were disproportionate and
unjust toward victim states and their civilians.158 Moreover, the War on 
Terror has a designated enemy (i.e., terrorists) that cannot be defeated by
152.  Geneva Conventions Protocol II, supra note 105, art. 13. 
153.  ICRC, supra note 9, at 17–18. 
154. Id. at 18. 
155. Id.
156.  Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 51, art. 1, 25, 48; Geneva Conventions
Protocol II, supra note 105, art. 13, 18, 44; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of 
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 12, ratified on
Aug. 2, 1955, 6 U.S.T 3114 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, art. 12, ratified on Aug. 2, 1955, 6 U.S.T 3217; Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed
Forces at Sea, art. 12, ratified on Aug. 2, 1955, 6 U.S.T. 3217; Geneva Convention IV,
supra note 138, art. 16, 27, 49; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol
III) art. 4(A), December 8, 2005, 2404 U.N.T.S. 261.
157. IHL to Non-State Actors, supra note 36, at 5; Hybrid Warfare, supra note 37. 
158. IHL to Non-State Actors, supra note 36, at 5. 
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military means.159 Instead of decreasing terrorism, the effect of the War 
on Terror has counterproductively increased terrorism and violence in the 
Middle East and insecurity in the West.160 Robert Pape noted that the War 
on Terror has increased terrorism and not decreased it.161 Sixteen intelligence
agencies in the “National Intelligence Estimate of 2006” report also concluded 
the same.162 Accordingly, Cornelia Beyer believes that Western economic 
policies are to blame for the recent rise in terrorism.163 In addition, Anthony 
Richards, Peter Kornbluh, and Marc Warren noted that the United States 
indirectly supports terrorists by providing them with a safe haven and 
protecting terrorist organizations from the GCs.164 
Similar to the problem of supporting terrorist groups, the use of rebels 
in an armed conflict, such as the use of mercenaries, is seen as the main 
cause of the increase in violence and terrorism.165 Rebels and mercenaries
are partners in the War on Terror; oftentimes, they are designated as 
terrorists and work together to help destabilize a region.166 They are employed
159. Todd Richissin, “War on Terror” Difficult to Define, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 2, 
2014), https://archive.seattletimes.com/archive/?date=20040902&slug=russanal02 [https://
perma.cc/98PU-YXWJ].
160. A. Trevor Thrall & Erik Goepner, Step Back: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy from 
the Failed War on Terror, CATO INST. (June 26, 2017), https://www.cato.org/publications/
policy-analysis/step-back-lessons-us-foreign-policy-failed-war-terror [https://perma.cc/
A2ZF-NKSS]; see Shirley Williams, The Seeds of Iraq’s Future Terror, GUARDIAN (Oct.
27, 2003), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/oct/28/iraq.politics [https://perma.cc/ 
67BP-YSAM].
161. ROBERT A. PAPE, DYING TO WIN: THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF SUICIDE TERRORISM
103 (2006). 
162. Mark Mazzetti, Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Worsens Terrorism Threat, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 24, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/world/middleeast/24terror. 
html [https://perma.cc/J89C-M9NT].
163. See CORNELIA BEYER, VIOLENT GLOBALISM: CONFLICT IN RESPONSE TO EMPIRE
80 (2008).
164. ANTHONY RICHARDS, THE IMPORTANCE OF AN AGREED DEFINITION OF TERRORISM 
25 (Oxford Uni. Press 2015); see Peter Kornbluh, A Safe Harbor for Luis Posada Carriles, 
N. AM. CONG. ON LATIN AM. (Sept. 25, 2007), https://nacla.org/article/safe-harbor-luis-
posada-carriles [https://perma.cc/C3NH-NVLG]; see also Mallory Shelbourne, Study 
Shows US Weapons Given to Syrian Rebels Ended Up in ISIS Hands, HILL (Dec. 14, 2017, 
12:45 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/defense/364917-study-shows-us-weapons-given-to-
syrian-rebels-ended-up-in-isiss-hands [https://perma.cc/KXU4-2GYA].
165. Shelbourne, supra note 164. 
166. See id.; see also Will Todman, Syria Is Forcing Former Rebels to Fight Their 
Friends, DEF. ONE (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/09/syria-forcing-
former-rebels-fight-their-friends/151039/ [https://perma.cc/36FF-NJN8]. 
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by states in armed conflict chiefly to fight proxy wars and change regimes, 
essentially for political interests while avoiding attribution and retribution.167 
The vacuum left by a regime change or the use of NSAs to change a regime
as insurgents and rebels, gives rise to violence, terrorism, and destabilization.168  
Iraq, Syria, and Libya are noteworthy case studies where NSAs were
employed, resulting in an increase in violence and terrorism directly attributable 
to regime change efforts.169 
In modern warfare, NSAs are a harsh reality.170 Mercenaries, rebels, and 
insurgents are used and employed as either proxy fighters or minions to 
serve political interests.171 Multiple appealing factors compound the problem 
of NSA employability. For instance, NSAs are employed to avoid attribution 
and retribution, and mercenaries (a form of NSA) are cheaper to operate
and maintain than their conventional counterparts—the armed forces.172 
1. Applying the GCs to NSAs 
Scholars who advocate for the applicability of humanitarian law to
NSAs encourage signing treaties and agreements with NSAs to enable the 
GCs to apply them.173 In essence, they advocate the urgency of engaging 
with NSAs to overcome the challenges of compliance in humanitarian 
law.174 However, IHL and the GCs are already applicable to NSAs.175 States 
should not sign treaties with NSAs for four main reasons. First, the monopoly 
to use force stays with states, whereas NSAs cannot use lawful force.176 
167. See Mosquera & Bachmann, supra note 35; see also Ashraf, supra note 35, at 7;
European Commission, supra note 39, at 2. 
 168. Principle of Proportionality, supra note 3, at 407. 
169. Id.
 170. See Kelley, supra note 9.
 171. IHL to Non-State Actors, supra note 36, at 7. 
172. See Hybrid Warfare, supra note 37, at 178; SEAN MCFATE, THE NEW RULES OF
WAR: VICTORY IN THE AGE OF DURABLE DISORDER 125 (2019). 
173. See Kelley, supra note 9, at 31. 
174. See id. at 31–34. 
175. Annyssa Bellal et al., International Law and Armed Non-state Actors in Afghanistan, 
93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 47, 55 (2011); see Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter 
Common Article 3]; see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Conflicts art. 1, June 
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 
8, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S 90 [hereinafter Rome Protocol]; see also Tatiana Londoño-
Camargo, The Scope of Application of International Humanitarian Law to Non-International 
Armed Conflicts, 130 VNIVERSITAS 207, 225 (2015). 
176. CAROLINE VARIN & DAUDA ABUBAKAR, VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS IN AFRICA:
TERRORISTS, REBELS AND WARLORDS 5 (2017) (explaining that by definition violent non-
state actors, including terrorists, rebels and warlords, are “considered to be illegitimately 
exercising violence”). 
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Second, state obligations under the GCs also apply to NSAs, creating criminal 
responsibility for NSAs.177 Third, because the GCs and humanitarian law 
are generally considered customary international law, they are as applicable 
to NSAs as they are to state actors.178 Finally, by signing humanitarian
agreements with NSAs, states can legitimize NSAs use of force by only 
restricting the ways that NSAs can use force against states, in the process 
nullifying the first point, the monopoly of states to use force.179 
In internal armed conflicts, territorial states enjoy a monopoly in the use 
of force and have the jurisdiction to hold criminals, such as NSAs, responsible 
during armed conflicts.180 By contrast, in international armed conflicts, the
International Criminal Court (ICC) has universal jurisdiction to prosecute
NSAs for violating humanitarian law.181 In internal armed conflicts, national
courts and the state are unable to enforce their laws against NSAs, and 
in international armed conflicts, international institutions, such as the ICC, 
are unable to enforce humanitarian law in the context of terrorists and 
NSAs.182 In both circumstances, the main problem remains that NSAs—
including terrorists, rebels, mercenaries, and insurgents—are outlaws who 
do not conform to or comply with any national or international law.183 This
lack of legal restriction makes the employment and use of NSAs more 
effective.184 NSAs are formidable forces that can bring targeted states to 
their knees by using asymmetric tactics, or by excessively violating 
humanitarian law and directly targeting civilians and civilian objects.185 
So, is there no way to stop these atrocities and enforce humanitarian law
against the use of force by NSAs?
177. Bellal et al., supra note 175, at 55. 
178. Id.
 179. See Dawn Steinhoff, Talking to the Enemy: State Legitimacy Concerns with
Engaging Non-state Armed Groups, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 297, 309–16 (2009); IHL to Non-State 
Actors, supra note 36, at 22. 
180. JEAN PORTER, MINISTERS OF THE LAW: A NATURAL LAW THEORY OF LEGAL
AUTHORITY 306 (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2010). 
181. See Héctor Olásolo, The Triggering Procedure of the International Criminal 
Court, Procedural Treatment of the Principle of Complementarity, and the Role of Office of the 
Prosecutor, 5 INT’L CRIM. REV. 121, 137 (2005); Londoño-Camargo, supra note 175, at 223; 
IHL to Non-State Actors, supra note 36, at 21. 
182. Gentian Zyberi, Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law, in  HUMAN
RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS, TRIBUNALS AND COURTS: LEGACY AND PROMISE 377, 381–94 (Gerd 
Oberleitner ed., 2018). 
183. Id. 
184. See Hybrid Warfare, supra note 37, at 186. 
185. Id. at 8–9. 
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If the issue of applying IHL to NSAs hinges upon compliance with and 
enforcement of the GCs,186 then the only plausible and rational solution
would be to aid and support the territorial states’ law enforcement agencies 
in fighting and prosecuting NSAs. To that end, all support to rebels, 
insurgents, terrorists, mercenaries, and NSAs must be outlawed and put to 
an end in practice. Aid and support to NSAs in cross-border states was 
technically outlawed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 
Nicaragua case.187 Yet, aggressive states that yearn for warfare to advance
their political interests support and aid insurgent groups by exploiting the 
lacunae of the international justice system, which lacks a sound system to 
enforce humanitarian law against NSAs.188 
2. What Does the Employment of NSAs Generate?
The destabilization in the Middle East, due to ongoing wars, was exacerbated
by Western coalition partners choosing to aid and support rebels and 
insurgents in the region.189 These groups do not comply with IHL and
use illegal force.190 If NSAs, such as insurgents or rebels, are supported by
invading states, it becomes more difficult for territorial states to enforce 
the law and fight NSAs. Additionally, if the main purpose of the GCs is to 
make warfare more humane,191 then foreign states must choose to support
territorial states in their fight against insurgencies and rebel groups rather 
than aiding NSAs for political purposes. Similarly, the ICJ and ICC must 
also prosecute states sponsoring NSAs in territorial states to stop the incessant 
violations of the GCs in modern warfare. 
The root cause of increases in violence, terrorism, and destabilization
of regions is the use of asymmetric war tactics where the employment of 
NSAs to use force lies in the center.192 The use of mercenaries and support
for insurgent groups, inadvertently, also increases terrorism and violations 
186. See Kelley, supra note 9, at 33; see also Krieger, supra note 9, at 8; see also Zyberi,
supra note 182. 
187. See Nicaragua, supra note 75, at 64 (effective control test). 
188. See LUIZ ALBERTO MONIZ BANDEIRA, THE SECOND COLD WAR: GEOPOLITICS
AND THE STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS OF THE USA 246, 291–95 (Américo Lucena Lage trans., 
Springer Int’l Pub. 2017); THEODOR MERON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: A VIEW FROM THE BENCH: SELECTED SPEECHES 68 (2011); Londoño-Camargo, 
supra note 175, at 223; IHL to Non-State Actors, supra note 36, at 21. 
189. See, e.g., BANDEIRA, supra note 188, at 293. 
190. VARIN & ABUBAKAR, supra note 176, at 5.
 191. EVAN J. CRIDDLE & EVAN FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY: HOW
INTERNATIONAL LAW CONSTITUTES AUTHORITY 177 (2016) (explaining the purpose of 
IHL); see also PRETORIA UNIVERSITY LAW PRESS, HUMAN RIGHTS, PEACE AND JUSTICE IN 
AFRICA: A READER 163 (Christof Heyns & Karen Stefiszyn eds., 2006). 
192. Hybrid Warfare, supra note 37, at 174. 
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of humanitarian law because the NSAs’ use of asymmetric tactics does 
not conform to any law.193 Hypothetically, if all aid to NSAs by agencies
and invading states was stopped and territorial states were supported 
by foreign governments to fight and prosecute NSAs, then the enforcement 
and lawfulness of the GCs would surely improve. When this analysis 
is applied to Syrian warfare, Western countries must ideally cease support 
to Syrian rebel and insurgent groups because support to Syrian rebels 
destabilizes the whole region, worsens humanitarian conditions, and makes 
it difficult for the Syrian law enforcement agencies to control violence, 
prosecute perpetrators, and fight terrorism.194 The ICJ and the ICC must 
prosecute sovereign states that are responsible for sponsoring NSAs for 
political purposes of regime change. The Western coalition partners and 
the international community should instead encourage the Syrian government 
to enforce humanitarian law by prosecuting NSAs for war crimes and 
illegal use of force.195 
3. The Use of Mercenaries
In the strategic need to subvert the conventional military means of warfare
such as firepower, airpower, ethics, and morality, asymmetric methods are 
employed to deliberately target civilians, cause excessive destruction, and 
evade enforcement of war crimes or humanitarian law under the GCs.196 
To meet this end, both weak and powerful states employ mercenaries/
insurgent groups to serve their political interests. Most notably, Western
powers in the Middle East used rebel groups to change the Assad regime 
in Syria and the Qaddafi regime in Libya.197 Mercenaries are mainly used 
to avoid attribution and retribution as a form of hybrid warfare.198 This is
because, to use force in self-defense, a victim state must prove that the 
aggressive state was in full control of the NSAs or mercenaries that 
conducted the offensive armed attack.199 So, the employment of mercenaries
dressed as civilians helps states circumvent the legal requirements of the 
full-control test in international law by attacking victim states without any 
193. See IHL to Non-State Actors, supra note 36, at 9, 17–18. 
194. See Principle of Proportionality, supra note 3. 
195. IHL to Non-State Actors, supra note 36. 
196. See Hybrid Warfare, supra note 37, at 178. 
197. See Principle of Proportionality, supra note 3. 
198. See Mosquera & Bachmann, supra note 35, at 11, 25; see also Ashraf, supra
note 35, at 7; see also European Commission, supra note 39. 
 199. See Nicaragua, supra note 75, ¶¶ 105–15 (effective control test). 
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possibility of being attributed to the attack.200 This issue regarding diffused
responsibility is known as “the problem of many” or “slippery hands” because 
when there are many hands involved in the hierarchy of mercenaries, the 
responsibility is conveniently diffused to avoid attribution.201 Mercenaries
are also employed because they are cheaper to maintain than conventional 
armed forces; the chief reason for mercenaries to commit to assignments 
is money or economic benefits.202 For this reason, Michael Walzer deems 
the use of mercenaries as dirty and believes that one of the biggest moral 
problems concerning the employability of mercenaries is the lack of 
accountability.203 
Another reason to deploy mercenaries is to avoid a conventional military 
standoff.204 Powerful countries use mercenaries in situations where armed
intervention is deemed unlawful in accordance with the international law 
of using force, whereas weak states use mercenaries to balance the inequality 
in armed power when fighting a powerful enemy.205 Some proponents of
the use of mercenaries for weaker states, such as David Rodin, believe 
that humanitarian law under the GCs must be relaxed for weak states using 
mercenaries to level the battlefield between weak victim states and strong 
aggressive states in an effort to achieve a chess-like equal-opportunities 
situation that allows each state the same chance to succeed.206 For this
reason, Rodin advocates for the relaxation of the GCs’ humanitarian rules 
for weaker parties to a conflict.207 The problem with this is that each state’s
military strength, technology, and training vary drastically, rendering equal 
opportunities impossible. Rodin also argues that guerilla tactics should be 
allowed because they are more efficient in fighting a war.208 However, the
argument of efficiency is not enough on its own to justify a relaxation
from humanitarian law without moral justification. If humanitarian law 
under the GCs is relaxed for any party, the lives of innocent people will 
be affected. Humanitarian law is enshrined in the GCs to protect the lives 
and property of innocent civilians who do not take part in an armed 
200. See Mosquera & Bachmann, supra note 35, at 25; see also Ashraf, supra note 
35, at 7; see also European Commission, supra note 39. 
 201. KATERI CARMOLA, PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS AND NEW WARS: RISK, LAW,
AND ETHICS 138 (2010). 
202. See UNIVERSITY OF BARCELONA, LAW SCHOOL, BARCELONA, SPAIN, PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY 
COMPANIES 72–73 (Helena Torroja ed., 2017) [hereinafter Torroja]. 
203. See Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, 2 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 160, 160–62 (1973); see also CARMOLA, supra note 201, at 136–37. 
204. See MCFATE, supra note 172, at 125.
 205. Id. at 128–29; see also Rodin, supra note 38. 
206. Rodin, supra note 38, at 158–59. 
207. See id. at 159.
 208. See id. at 156, 158.
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conflict.209 If this protection is lifted for the sake of efficiency, it will 
translate into more casualties and destruction. If the arguments of a chess-
like situation and efficiency of guerilla tactics are based on moral reasons 
of fairness for weaker parties to a conflict,210 then what about justice and
fairness for the innocent people who will be affected by lifting the protection 
of humanitarian law? 
4. Relaxation of the GCs 
While Rodin advocates for the legalization of guerilla tactics for weaker 
states due to its efficiency, Fritz Allhoff supports “lethal covert action” 
for armed forces so that they can fight terrorists and NSAs.211 Allhoff argues 
that the use of efficient guerilla tactics by terrorists and NSAs puts armed 
forces playing by the humanitarian guidelines at a disadvantage.212 Therefore,
a state’s armed forces should also be allowed to violate humanitarian law 
by using irregular tactics as a way to equalize their battlefield footing against 
terrorists as a matter of necessity and exceptionalism.213 Allhoff employs
the language of necessity to advocate the use of torture, assassination, and 
violation of the due process of law, while explicitly noting that these practices 
are proscribed by international law.214 The problem, however, is that if people
are not identified properly during targeted assassinations or by violations 
of due processes of law, innocent people may be killed or imprisoned.215 
The world has witnessed the outcome of assassination of targets through 
drone attacks—a disproportionate killing of innocent civilians.216 Crawford’s 
research noted that 10 innocent people die for every assassination attempt 
by drones.217 This means if humanitarian law is relaxed for armed forces 
to fight terrorists and NSAs, then the protection offered to civilians and 
innocent people will be lost and, subsequently, the current situation of civilian 
209.  Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 51. 
210. See Rodin, supra note 38, at 158. 
211. See id. at 156; ROUTLEDGE, supra note 9, at 204–05. 
212. See ROUTLEDGE, supra note 9, at 228.
 213. See generally Allhoff, supra note 9 (discussing exceptionalism, which grants
permission for soldiers in active combat to use lethal force). 
214. See ROUTLEDGE, supra note 9, at 204–06, 215.
 215. See Drone Attacks, supra note 116, at 102. 
216. Id. at 104. 
217. CRAWFORD, supra note 116; see Drone Attacks, supra note 116, at 104. 
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catastrophe where millions of innocent people are affected by wars will 
continue to worsen.218 
The International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing 
and Training of Mercenaries 1989 explicitly criminalized the use, financing, 
and training of mercenaries.219 Yet, mercenaries are still heavily employed 
by both powerful and weak parties in modern warfare.220 To tackle the
prevailing humanitarian crises caused by the use of mercenaries in contemporary 
warfare tactics, the international community must come together to adopt 
a new universal convention to regulate actions against the states’ divergent 
methods of hybrid warfare without accountability.221 Section II.E of this Article
will elaborate on the challenges faced by the GCs by another form of hybrid 
warfare—cyberwarfare. 
E. Cyberwarfare 
As the nature of conflict has evolved, states and NSAs have started to 
employ cyberspace as a new battlefield by weaponizing advances in technology. 
Cyberattacks do not respect international borders, and civilians are caught 
in the digital crossfire of misinformation campaigns and cyberattacks on 
critically important infrastructure.222 Untraceable cyberattacks can take
place in a matter of seconds by targeting data centers, clouds, server farms, 
and intelligent infrastructure, including power grids, without the world 
knowing about it for a year.223 Cyberattacks, such as the WannaCry attack
of 2017, highlight the importance of reflecting on international laws to 
protect the security of the civilian population and infrastructure.224 
1. Calls for a Digital Geneva Convention 
Given the fact that the GCs were promulgated to protect civilians and
civilian objects during armed attacks, there have been calls for a Geneva 
Convention 5.0—“A Digital Geneva Convention”—particularly to protect
218. See Principle of Proportionality, supra note 3, at 407. 
219. The International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training
of Mercenaries art. 2, Dec. 4, 1989, 2163 U.N.T.S. 1-37789. 
220. See, e.g., MCFATE, supra note 172, at 124–34; see also Rodin, supra note 38. 
221. See Torroja, supra note 202, at 78; see also Mosquera & Bachmann, supra note 
35, at 6–8, 25–26; see also Ashraf, supra note 35, at 2–6; see also European Commission, 
supra note 39. 
222. Guay & Rudnick, supra note 9.
 223. James Carlini, Geneva Convention in Cyberwarfare? Don’t Count on It, INT’L 
POL’Y DIGEST (Aug. 6, 2017), https://intpolicydigest.org/geneva-convention-cyberwarfare- 
don-t-count/ [https://perma.cc/Z9DS-ZFAP].
224. Guay & Rudnick, supra note 9.
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civilians and civilian objects from cyberattacks.225 In February 2017, at an
RSA security conference in San Francisco, Microsoft President Brad 
Smith introduced the idea of developing protocols by giving the private 
sector a stronger role in humanitarian work to protect the civilian population 
and critical infrastructure because tech giants are already aware of cyber 
threats and possess the technical know-how to defend against them.226 Guay
and Rudnick propose that, to cater to cyber threats and protect civilians 
who are already vulnerable, a new humanitarian framework should be formed 
by routing humanitarian assistance to private tech giants.227 Leigher also
believes that a new convention, rules of engagement, and guidelines 
on cyberwarfare should be formed to protect the general public and states 
from cyberattacks.228 
In 2018, the U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres emphasized that
the international community must address the lack of rules in international 
law for confronting cyberwars.229 He claimed that “we have not been able
to discuss whether . . . the Geneva Conventions appl[ies] to cyber war or 
whether . . . international humanitarian law applies to cyberwar.”230 On 
another occasion, in Lisbon, he asserted that “episodes of cyber warfare 
already exist [and] there is no regulatory scheme for that type of warfare 
[because] it is not clear how the Geneva Convention[s] or humanitarian 
laws apply.”231 For these reasons, Guterres proposed that the First Committee
of the U.N. General Assembly should be used to seriously address the 
applicability of the GCs and humanitarian law on the issues of cyberwar.232 
Guterres’s assertions raised a few eyebrows since rules to address 
cyberwarfare already exist.233 He undermined his own call for the international




 228. Bill Leigher, It’s Time for a Cyber Geneva Convention, ATLANTIC COUNCIL
(Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/it-s-time-for-a-cyber-
geneva-convention [https://perma.cc/R2W5-RY4Z].
229. David P. Fidler, The UN Secretary-General’s Call for Regulating Cyberwar






 233. See id. 
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violating humanitarian and human rights law without accountability.234 
The laws he claimed were violated are the applicable to cyberwarfare.
There has been extensive discussion on the application of humanitarian
law, including the GCs, and the law of using force against cyberwarfare.235 
For instance, the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) agreed that
the international law of using force applies in cyberspace, which led to the 
integration of cyber operation analysis into states’ law manuals.236 Similarly,
the Tallinn Manual and the International Committee of the Red Cross discussed 
the scenarios of cyberattacks on critically important state infrastructure 
to address questions and the applicability of international humanitarian 
law and international law of using force to combat it.237 While instances 
of cyber interference in state elections do not attract the applicability 
of humanitarian laws, they do apply human rights law and other critical 
principles of sovereignty and nonintervention.238 
Guterres is not the first person to demand the stronger role for international 
law on the issue of cyberwarfare, nor will he be the last.239 The key, however,
is to not blur the lines of peace and war or ignore discussions in the 
international community regarding the implications and applicability of 
international law to cyberwar.240 Oftentimes, the chief concern for those 
like Guterres is cybersecurity rather than cyberwar.241 Tarah Wheeler also 
erroneously believes that no rules apply to cyberwar and confuses cybersecurity 
with cyberwar.242 Wheeler claims that outsourcing cybersecurity to the
private sector has exposed states to foreign cyberattacks, resulting in a 
situation where international law is not clear about what constitutes an 
armed attack in cyberspace.243 Similarly, Wheeler believes that assuming 
conventional international law applies to cyberwarfare is flawed.244 She
adds that no international law requires other states to take precautions to 
234. Id.
235. Waseem Ahmad Qureshi, Cyberwarfare: A Tortuous Problem for the Law of
Armed Conflicts, 28 TULANE J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 1 (2019) [hereinafter Cyberwarfare].
236. Fidler, supra note 229. 
237. Id.; INT’L GRP. OF EXPERTS, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2013) [hereinafter TALLINN 
MANUAL] (a non-binding academic study on the application of international laws on cyber-
warfare).




 242. Tarah Wheeler, In Cyberwar, There Are No Rules, FOREIGN POL’Y (Sept. 12, 
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assess civilian casualties and collateral damage during a cyberoperation.245 
Waugh also believes that international law is not directly applicable to 
cyberwarfare, and that the world only applies existing redundant laws and 
regulations.246 These laws are essentially state-centered and do not even 
define what constitutes an armed attack or who is considered a belligerent.247 
Therefore, “A Digital Geneva Convention” is long overdue to define new 
cyber problems and propose solutions.248 
2. Application of Existing Laws 
It is naive to believe that the international law of using force and 
humanitarian law under the GCs do not apply to cyberwarfare since the 
international community has put forth a considerable amount of effort into 
interpreting and applying the existing law on cyberwar.249 For instance, 
the Tallinn Manual provides a detailed overview of applicable guidelines 
on the ramifications of cyberattacks and humanitarian protection offered 
to civilians and civilian objects.250 Similarly, the U.S. Department of
Defense Field Manual and the U.K. Joint Service Manual on Armed Conflicts 
explicitly acknowledge that these international agreementsapply to cyberwars.251 
Several scholars also highlight the jus in bello and jus ad bellum principles 
to cyberwarfare.252 
Furthermore, the Tallinn Manual provides a comprehensive list and
explanation of what constitutes a legitimate target in cyberwarfare in the 
context of the principle of distinction under the GCs.253 This includes
“computers, computer networks, and cyber infrastructure” that contribute 
245. Id.
 246.  Steve Waugh, Geneva Conventions for Cyber Warriors Long Overdue, NAT’L 
DEF. MAG. (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/3/18/
geneva-conventions-for-cyber-warriors-long-overdue [https://perma.cc/SBG2-E24X]. 
247.  Id. 
 248.  See id. 
 249.  Iain Sutherland et al., The Geneva Conventions and Cyber-Warfare, 160 RUSI 
J. 30, 30 (2015). 
250. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 237. 
251. Sutherland et al., supra note 249. 
252. See id. at 31; Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 
(Oct. 29, 2010), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/jus-ad-bellum-jus-in-bello [https://perma.cc/
AC3T-7N48] (explaining that jus in bello is international humanitarian law that governs 
the conduct of warfare, while jus ad bellum determines whether war is permissible).
253. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 237. 
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to military actions.254 This list, however, does not mean that the distinction 
of what constitutes a legitimate target is straightforward or that international 
humanitarian law under the GCs warrants no further consideration to form 
more detailed guidelines.255 For instance, some infrastructure—such as
medical databases that keep records of soldiers or the storage of both military 
and civil information on the cloud for interdependencies and interconnection 
reasons—can serve the dual purpose of aiding military and civilian 
objectives, thus reverting their purposes back and forth, causing problems 
of graduality.256 Ideally, military and civilian systems should be separate
so that a cyberattack targeting the military does not cause damage to 
civilians. 
Additionally, the Tallinn Manual protects infrastructure, such as dams,
dikes, and nuclear sites, from cyberattacks so civilians are not caught in 
the collateral damage.257 This is particularly notable because cyberattacks
have historically targeted sites that contain dangerous forces, such as the 
attack on the Iranian civilian nuclear facility using the Stuxnet virus.258 
The international law on cyberwar should be simple. If the results of a 
cyberattack are the same as those of a kinetic attack, then there is no need 
to reach a different conclusion. For example, in the attack on the supervisory 
control and data acquisition system (SCADA), which releases the water 
of a dam, it should not matter whether the destruction by water release 
was caused by a drone attack or a cyberattack.259 The same reasoning can 
be used to apply humanitarian principles enshrined in the GCs to analyze 
the repercussions of cyberattacks. For instance, civilian objects and lives 
are protected by the principle of distinction under the GCs, so an attack 
destroying civilian objects or lives would violate the principle of distinction 
regardless of whether kinetic or cyber means were employed.260 Likewise, 
the same result-oriented reasoning can be used to apply the principles of 
precaution and proportionality.261 
The main problem, however, remains that NSAs, such as terrorists, do 
not respect international and humanitarian laws, so it is likely that they 
254.  Id. at 125, 134; Sutherland et al., supra note 249, at 31–32. 
255.  Sutherland et al., supra note 249, at 31. 
256. Id. at 31–32. 
257.  Id. at 33; TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 237, at 143. 
258.  Sutherland et al., supra note 249, at 33. 
259. Id. at 32. 
260. Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 51, art. 48; Geneva Conventions 
Protocol II, supra note 105, art. 13; TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 237, at 125, 134. 
261. See Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 51, art. 51(4), 57(2); see also
Cyberwarfare, supra note 235, at 29–33 (for different approaches of applying international 
law on cyberwarfare). 
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will never sign or abide by any agreement that wishes to regulate cyberwars.262 
Therefore, the only reasonable step to protect a target from cyberattacks 
is to increase cybersecurity because tanks and F-35s will not be able to 
defend against a cyberattack by a single hacker terrorist.263 For these reasons, 
Leigher proposes that cybersecurity can be improved by increasing Department 
of Defense (DoD) security, establishing the internal structure of security 
agencies, and enhancing the cyber capabilities of joint armed forces.264 
Furthermore, to strengthen cybersecurity, infrastructure, and the protection of
civilian objects, Sutherland, Xynos, Jones, and Blyth recommend using 
symbols, emblems, and warning banners—in physical and digital forms, 
as they are used to protect and denote medical facilities and armed forces 
—to mark neutral objects.265 In the meantime, there must be other ways
to efficiently induce compliance and enforce humanitarian law enshrined 
in the GCs. Accordingly, Section II.F will elaborate on recommendations 
to induce compliance and enforce GCs among warring states. 
F. Enforcement and Compliance 
Violations of the GCs, such as war crimes, prompt individual and state 
criminal responsibilities.266 Zyberi noted that non-international armed 
conflicts, and therein the use of national and international force by NSA 
groups controlling large parts of territories, are the main cause of the 
proliferation of violence and indiscriminate violations of humanitarian
law.267 While humanitarian law chiefly applies to international armed conflicts,
the nature of customary international law makes part of the GCs equally 
applicable to non-international armed conflicts.268 The enforcement mechanisms
for humanitarian law are domestic, regional, and international, with both 
judicial and nonjudicial natures.269 But the states retain the duty to enforce 
humanitarian law under Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.270 To 
enforce IHL, states take monitoring, preventive, punitive, and supervisory 
262.  Sutherland et al., supra note 249, at 31; Carlini, supra note 223. 
263.  Carlini, supra note 223. 
264.  Leigher, supra note 228. 
265.  Sutherland et al., supra note 249, at 30–31. 
266.  Zyberi, supra note 182, at 393. 
267.  Id. 
268.  Id. 
269.  Id. 
270.  Geneva Convention I, supra note 156. 
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steps through domestic courts.271 Likewise, regional human rights organizations 
have managed to help states enforce IHL by developing standards of conduct 
with the assistance of courts and commissions, despite lacking jurisdiction.272 
International criminal courts and tribunals that focus on individual 
criminal liability for war crimes have performed important functions with 
regard to responsibility, accountability, and reconciliation against violations 
of the GCs.273 For instance, tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
serve as deterrents for breaches of the GCs.274 Therefore, according to 
Green, it is likely that similar ad hoc tribunals and international criminal 
courts will be called upon for post facto process and punishment.275 Yet, 
it is vital that the domestic criminal courts must strengthen the functioning 
of international tribunals and criminal courts.276 The most important role
for the enforcement of humanitarian law is left to United Nations organs 
at the international level, but this is limited by the permeating selectivity 
of power politics calculations,277 which has left the contemporary world 
with unpunished and untethered violations of humanitarian law.278 
1. Inducing Compliance 
The problem of nonenforcement of humanitarian law can be handled by
inducing compliance among NSAs, which are increasingly trending towards 
violence in international and non-international armed conflicts.279 Actors
other than concerned states can induce compliance with humanitarian law 
in war-torn areas to invigorate a sense of neutrality.280 In this regard,
international organizations play an important role in enforcing humanitarian 




275. L. C. Green, Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law and Threats to 
National Sovereignty, 8 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 101, 130 (2003). 
276. Zyberi, supra note 182, at 393. 
277. Id.
 278. Id. at 17–18. 
279. Krieger, supra note 9, at 34 (discussing inducement of compliance); Phil Williams, 
Violent Non-State Actors and National and International Security, INT’L RELS. & SEC. 
NETWORK (2008), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/93880/vnsas.pdf [https://perma.cc/MEV2-
XYUK] (discussing the increasing role of non-state actors—such as terrorists, warlords, 
and insurgents—in national and international violence); Christopher P. Dallas-Feeney, 
Violent Non-State Actors in the Middle East: Origins and Goals, E-INTERNATIONAL RELS. 
(May 28, 2019), https://www.e-ir.info/2019/05/28/violent-non-state-actors-in-the-middle-
east-origins-and-goals/ [https://perma.cc/JC3S-37RV] (discussing major violent non-state 
actors that mount campaigns of violence in the Middle East). 
280. Dallas-Feeney, supra note 279. 
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law.281 But the political willingness of their member states determines the 
efficacy of measures for inducing compliance.282 Thus, NSAs are widely 
deployed to expedite the resolution of armed conflicts at the expense of 
excessive violations of the GCs where international organizations are 
unwilling to act. NSAs perceive international organizations to be neutral 
actors that can contribute to inducing compliance by adopting compliance 
mechanisms based on traditional motives and logic of consequences.283 
The mechanisms of inducing compliance independently reinforce each 
other.284 Since hardcore and regular violators are not convinced by persuasion
alone, the threat of coercion must be used along with collaborative dialogue 
and adverse legislation to induce compliance.285 Compliance-inducing 
mechanisms and persuasion work more smoothly if they are complemented 
by instruments of coercive legal enforcement.286 If ad hoc efforts are
directed at isolated contexts, the efficiency of inducing compliance will 
be much lower.287 By contrast, legal enforcement will benefit from persuasion, 
if both are applied concurrently.288 The instruments chosen to induce 
compliance and persuasion in addition to coercive legal enforcement 
legislation depend on the choice of an inducer.289 This choice will mainly be
contingent upon considerations of the addressee’s behavior, legal competences, 
social deliberation, political alliances and dynamics, geopolitical shifts, 
and the distinct context of the conflict zone where it is being applied.290 
However, it is pertinent to note that, unlike NSAs held captive by a 
domestic legal regime, armed NSA groups can only be dealt with by
enforcement of international law during an armed conflict because domestic 
law cannot be enforced against armed bands of NSAs fighting the same 
281. Zyberi, supra note 182, at 383. 
282. Krieger, supra note 9, at 34; see Dep’t for Int’l Dev., Understanding Political 
Will, GOV.UK (Jan. 1, 2004), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08cbfed
915d622c001551/R8236Appendix3.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A7J-9UJV] (“When a political
actor is willing to commit precious time, energy, funds and political capital to achieve 
change—when [the political actor] is prepared to take risks and to incur opportunity costs 
to that end—we can safely conclude that [the political actor] is exhibiting ‘political will.’ 
The Individual and the Collective.”). 
283.  Krieger, supra note 9, at 34. 
284. Id. at 34–35. 
285.  See Kelley, supra note 9, at 26–32; Krieger, supra note 9, at 34–35. 
286.  Krieger, supra note 9, at 34–35. 
287. Id. at 35. 
288. Id. at 34–35. 
289. Id. at 35. 
290. Id.
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national legal system.291 It is essential to engage with armed groups to
improve the situation of civilians caught in armed conflict, which in turn 
enforces humanitarian law.292 Of course, in such engagement, state interests 
should be accommodated.293 The empirical data has found that the efforts
of the international community to protect civilian lives may have serious 
consequences for civilians living under armed conflict if these efforts work 
against political development and the conflict dynamics of the concerned 
area.294 Therefore, these findings must also be considered and applied during 
the engagement and application of compliance tactics.295 
If the goal is to increase the effectiveness and compliance of the GCs, 
productive dialogue must be pursued to engage armed NSAs.296 The 
unwillingness of political interests to engage NSAs in dialogue will not 
reduce the intensity of violence in contemporary warfare.297 In fact, the
political will to avoid engaging in peaceful dialogue with NSAs will only 
worsen the suffering of civilians during armed conflicts.298 In a 2010 report, 
the former U.N. Secretary-General insisted that member states must “consider 
the potential humanitarian consequences of their legal and policy initiatives 
and to avoid introducing measures that have the effect of inhibiting 
humanitarian actors in their efforts to engage armed groups for humanitarian 
purposes.”299 Accordingly, as ICRC President Jakob Kellenberger rightly
noted, “[T]he lack of compliance of non-state armed groups is a very 
serious problem that we need to address, reinforcement of international 
law rules and mechanisms lies in the hands of States.”300 For these reasons,
Kelley advocates relaxing the humanitarian law enshrined in the GCs to 
engage NSAs and weakening the humanitarian consequences of armed
conflicts on civilian lives.301 However, if humanitarian law is relaxed, the
protection offered for civilian lives under the GCs will be lost or at least 
diminished. So, if the goal is to protect civilians, it seems oxymoronic and 
hypocritical to relax the protection offered to civilian lives. 
291.  Sassóli, supra note 9, at 63. 




 296.  Kelley, supra note 9, at 32. 
297. Id. at 32–33. 
298. Id. at 33. 
299. U.N. Secretary-General, Report Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians
in Armed Conflict, ¶ 57, U.N. Doc. S/2010/579 (Nov. 11, 2010). 
300. Jacob Kellenberger, President, Int’l Comm. Red Cross, Address at the Ministerial
Working Session for the 60th Anniversary of the Geneva Conventions: Ensuring Respect 
for International Humanitarian Law in a Changing Environment and the Role of the United 
Nations (Sept. 26, 2009). 
301. Kelley, supra note 9, at 33. 
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Kelley deems IHL ill-fitting, slow, and ineffective in modern warfare 
involving NSAs and asymmetric tactics because willingness to comply 
depends on the perceived relevance and its stipulations.302 Thus, Kelley
suggests that new laws must be formed to protect NSAs from domestic 
laws, so that they are induced to comply with IHL.303 Kelley also proposes
that, since international conventions cannot be signed by NSAs for legal 
reasons, unilateral deeds of commitment, memoranda of understanding, 
and action plans by NSAs should be formed to reflect their understandings 
and military commitments.304 Sassóli also offers a similar solution, that a
simple and short code of conduct, tailored to the context of each NSA, 
should be designed to “ensure military discipline while respecting local 
culture and the civilian population, while remaining in compliance with 
international norms.”305 Likewise, to promote compliance among NSAs,
national broadcast and social media should be used to endorse an understanding 
of what humanitarian law expects in armed conflicts, to ensure that NSAs 
recognize and have a basic knowledge of civilian protection.306 Often,
NSAs are oblivious about their obligations under IHL.307 
III. CONCLUSION
Although GCs have immensely improved conditions for prisoners of 
war and medical operations during armed conflicts, in considering the
effectiveness of the regime, the scale of humanitarian law violations during 
armed conflicts under the aegis of the GCs dwarfs the size of their success.308 
Tannenwald shows that, owing to the magnitude and sophistication of means 
of using force, the effects of wars on civilian populations have become 
harsher in modern warfare than they were before the GCs.309 Similarly,
Randolph Martin believes that “civilian population displacement and 
302. Id. at 26–28. 
303. Id. at 27. 
304. Id. at 29. 
305. Sassóli, supra note 9, at 64; ANNYSSA BELLAL & STUART CASEY-MASLEN, GENEVA 
ACAD. INT’L L & HUM. RIGHTS, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: PROTECTING CIVILIANS THROUGH 
DIALOGUE WITH ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS 35 (Oct. 2011), https://www.geneva-academy.
ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/Research%20documents/Rules-of-Engagement-EN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6HSN-DPET].
306. Kelley, supra note 9, at 30. 
307. Id. at 29–30. 
308. TANNENWALD, supra note 1, at 5.
 309. Id.
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casualties have increasingly become the purpose rather than a by-product 
of war.”310 Since the 1990s, civilians makeup 80% to 90% of war victims 
compared to only 5% during World War I.311 Some analysts claims that
the number of civilian and military deaths during World War II were 
equal, and the international community agrees that, since then, the number 
of civilian victims has exceeded the military casualties.312 This trend of
increasing numbers of civilian victims coincides with the advent of the 
GCs, which implies that the GCs produce a counterproductive effect.313 
For instance, the Afghan War proved to be disproportionate to its military 
objectives.314 It counterproductively increased terrorism, destabilized 
Afghanistan, and inadvertently decreased U.S. security at the cost of 
billions of dollars, hundreds of thousands of lives, the destruction of 
essential services in Afghanistan, and more than a million war crimes.315 
Similarly, the Iraq War was not only unlawful under the U.N. Charter, but 
also grossly violated humanitarian law under the GCs.316 The Iraq War
cost 190 million dollars per day, caused the deaths of half a million people, 
displaced more than three million people, destroyed Iraqi infrastructure 
and governance, and increased violence.317 The Syrian War also increased
violence and terrorism in Syria, destabilizing the whole region.318 Its 
consequences have left two million people injured, and has caused the killing, 
kidnapping, and torturing of millions more.319 More than five million
Syrians have become registered refugees, and 7.6 million (almost half of 
the Syrian population) is displaced internally and internationally.320 
310. Id.
 311. Id.
 312. Id. at 6. 
313. Id.
 314.  Principle of Proportionality, supra note 3, at 411. 
315. See generally REICH & DOMBROSWKI, supra note 46, at 36; Al Jazeera English, 
supra note 42; Crawford, supra note 54 (discussing the costs of war for Afghanistan); see 
generally General Security Situation in Afghanistan, supra note 66 (state of Afghanistan after
decades of war); Why Afghanistan Is More Dangerous Than Ever, supra note 48; Gannon,
supra note 49. 
316. Lessons of Iraq War, supra note 61; see generally Principle of Proportionality, 
supra note 3, at 412–16. 
317. REICH & DOMBROSWKI, supra note 46, at 36; Neta C. Crawford, Iraqi Civilians, 
WATSON INST. INT’L & PUB. AFF.: COSTS OF WAR (Nov. 2018), https://watson.brown.edu/costsof
war/costs/human/civilians/iraqi [https://perma.cc/2JHE-9UXZ]; Amnesty Int’l, supra note 66; 
GARRIAUD-MAYLAM, supra note 66; UNHCR Returns to Iraq, supra note 66; McMahan, supra 
note 66; see generally Al Jazeera English, supra note 42. 
318. See GARRIAUD-MAYLAM, supra note 66. 
319. Id.; UNHCR International Protection, supra note 81, at 7.
 320. GARRIAUD-MAYLAM, supra note 66; UNHCR International Protection, supra
note 81, at 24; The Syrian Situation – International Humanitarian Law Violations and the 
Call for Justice: A Summary, AL-MARSAD, http://golan-marsad.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
258
QURESHI_22-2 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2021 9:22 AM     
  



















[VOL. 22:  219, 2021] Modern War
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
Humanitarian law under the GCs is also violated by NSAs that are backed
by coalition forces, terrorists, and the government of Syria.321 
While investigating the humanitarian crisis and the inefficiency of the 
GCs, the 2019 ICRC report noted that certain types of ammunitions are 
highly inaccurate and, therefore, can cause serious problems when used 
in populated urban areas.322 These weapons include mortars, rocket launchers, 
artillery and unguided missiles, rockets, and munitions.323 For example,
for every drone attack targeting one person, on average ten innocent people 
are killed.324 To decrease humanitarian crises, despite there being no 
prohibition on the use of explosives in populated areas, the ICRC suggests 
that the use of big explosive weapons should be banned in urbanized regions 
during armed conflicts for three main reasons.325 First, there is a pattern
of high civilian harm due to the use of explosive weapons in urbanized 
regions.326 Second, it is unfeasible to respect the principles of proportionality 
and distinction while using explosive weapons in populated areas.327 
Third, there is no regularity over the application and employment of explosive 
weapons in populated areas.328 To prohibit the use of explosive weapons
in populated areas, states should eagerly participate in ICRC armed forces 
training on weapons adaptability in accordance with the urbanized settings of 
armed conflicts to vigorously consider the vulnerabilities of civilians and 
civilian objects.329  
Modern warfare is being orchestrated with the idea of consciously 
avoiding attribution for war crimes.330 For this purpose, states routinely
employ NSAs and mercenaries so that the retaliatory actions and the 
attribution of war crimes are avoided,331 which explains the increase in the
number of civilian victims in recent wars. The reason for this is that 
terrorists and the asymmetric tactics of NSAs deliberately target civilians 
The-Syrian-Situation-International-Law-Violations-and-the-Call-for-Justice-A-Summary.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F7KP-3YJ5].
321.  UNHCR International Protection, supra note 81, at 17. 
322.  ICRC, supra note 9, at 20. 
323. Id.
 324.  CRAWFORD, supra note 116; Drone Attacks, supra note 116, at 96. 
325.  ICRC, supra note 9, at 21–22. 
326. Id.
 327. Id. at 22. 
328. Id.
 329. Id. at 15. 
330. See Mosquera & Bachmann, supra note 35, at 13–14; see also Ashraf, supra
note 35, at 13–14; see also European Commission, supra note 39, at 7. 
331. See IHL to Non-State Actors, supra note 36, at 21–22. 
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to compensate for the imbalance of power in numerical strength and 
resources.332 Analogously, mercenaries (a form of NSA) are employed
because they are cheaper to operate and maintain than their conventional 
counterparts, the armed forces.333 While, in internal armed conflicts, national
courts and states are unable to enforce their laws against NSAs, international 
institutions, such as the ICC, are unable to enforce humanitarian law in 
the context of terrorists and NSAs in international armed conflicts.334 In 
both instances, the main problem remains that NSAs are outlaws who lack 
the incentives to conform to or comply with national or international law, 
and that is what makes the employment and use of NSAs more effective.335 
For this reason, Michael Walzer deems the use of mercenaries to be dirty 
and believes that one of the biggest moral problems concerning the employability 
of mercenaries is the lack of accountability.336 Hence, if the whole NSA 
problem of applying IHL hinges upon the compliance and enforcement of 
the GCs,337 then the only plausible and sane solution would be to aid and
support the territorial states’ law enforcement agencies to fight and prosecute 
NSAs. To that end, counties should outlaw all support to rebels, insurgents, 
terrorists, mercenaries, and NSAs. 
Though, the international law of using force is simple, it still has downsides
in enforcement and compliance. The law on cyberwarfare requires that if 
the results of a cyberattack are the same as that of a kinetic attack, then 
there is no need to reach different conclusions.338 This result-oriented
approach for applying international humanitarian law on cyberattacks can 
also be used to apply principles of distinction, precaution, and proportionality 
on cyberwarfare.339 Nevertheless, the main problem remains that NSAs
do not respect any international or humanitarian law, which foretells that 
they will also remain noncompliant towards regulations on cyberwarfare 
in the future.340 Therefore, in situations where international law cannot
protect vulnerable targets from cyberattacks by NSAs, the cybersecurity
of vulnerable facilities must be increased.341 Leigher recommends increasing
332. See Rodin, supra note 38. 
333. MCFATE, supra note 172, at 125. 
334. Zyberi, supra note 182, at 392. 
335. Id. at 379; see Hybrid Warfare, supra note 37, at 186. 
336. Walzer, supra note 203, at 178–79; see also CARMOLA, supra note 201, at 136–37. 
337. Kelley, supra note 9, at 33; Krieger, supra note 9, at 31; Zyberi, supra note 182, 
at 392–93. 
338. Sutherland et al., supra note 249, at 31. 
339. Geneva Conventions Protocol I, supra note 51, art. 48, 51; see Geneva Conventions 
Protocol II, supra note 105, art. 13; see also TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 237, at 125–37. See 
generally Cyberwarfare, supra note 235, at 1–39 (explaining different approaches of applying 
international law to cyberwarfare). 
340. Sutherland et al., supra note 249, at 31; Carlini, supra note 223. 
341. Carlini, supra note 223. 
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DoD security, establishing internal structure of security agencies, and 
enhancing cyber capabilities of joint armed forces to drastically improve 
cybersecurity.342 Likewise, Sutherland, Xynos, Jones, and Blyth suggest 
that symbols, emblems, and warning banners should be used to mark 
neutral objects and facilities in order to increase cybersecurity and protect 
civilian objects and infrastructure of critical importance.343 
The problem of nonenforcement of international humanitarian law can
be handled by inducing compliance among NSAs, which are increasingly 
leaning towards violence in armed conflicts.344 Competence for inducing
compliance with international humanitarian law in war-torn areas can be 
allocated to non-state actors in order to invigorate a sense of neutrality.345 
The mechanisms of inducing compliance independently reinforce each 
other.346 Since violators are rarely convinced by persuasion alone, a mixture
of instruments must be used to induce compliance, such as the threat of 
coercion, collaborative dialogue, and adverse legislation.347 The selection 
of instruments will depend on behavior, legal competences, social deliberation, 
political alliances and dynamics, geopolitical shifts, and the distinct context 
of the conflict zone where the instruments will be applied.348 By contrast,
the political will to not engage in peaceful dialogues with NSAs will only 
worsen the suffering of civilians during armed conflicts.349 Since international
conventions cannot be signed by NSAs for legal reasons, unilateral deeds 
of commitment, memoranda of understanding, and action plans by NSAs 
should be implemented to reflect their mutual understandings and military 
commitments.350 Likewise, simple and short codes of conduct, tailored 
according to the context of each NSA, should be designed to resolve the 
problems of the GCs’ compliance and enforcement.351 
342. Leigher, supra note 228. 
343. Sutherland et al., supra note 249, at 30–31. 
344. Krieger, supra note 9, at 34. 
345. See id. at 34–35; see, e.g., GENEVA CALL, www.genevacall.org [https://perma.cc/
W9N4-WY3C].
346.  Krieger, supra note 9, at 34. 
347. Id. at 34–35. 
348. Id.
 349.  Kelley, supra note 9, at 27. 
350. Id. at 29. 
351. Sassóli, supra note 9, at 64.
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